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ABSTRACT 
Broadly, this thesis argues that success in Afghanistan—for Afghans and their 
neighbors alike—entails establishing state-building measures, supremacy of law and 
human rights, rapid economic growth, and strong Afghan National Security Forces who 
can encourage the Afghan public to accept the practices of stable democracy and good 
neighborly relations. 
To fix some of the myriad variables in Afghanistan’s likely state in 2026, which 
will mark the end of the “transformation decade” following the U.S. withdrawal in 2016, 
the proposed project installs three hypothetical scenarios: The Good, The Bad, and The 
Ugly. These scenarios do not predict the future in Afghanistan but rather shed light on the 
factors and variables that will shape the postwar period. Examining such scenarios may 
allow strategic planners to develop alternative measures for complex situations. Sustained 
political stability and the will to reform by the Afghan establishment, fortified by 
consistent international financial and military support for at least 10 to 15 or more years, 
would likely be the key to success in the Afghanistan end game. Otherwise, Afghanistan 
will slip back into a situation much like the one that emerged after the Soviet 
withdrawal—extremism, war, and instability. The scenarios are developed by examining 
several factors: the criticality of the Afghan issue throughout history; Afghanistan’s 
indigenous facts and prospects; Pak–Afghan cross-interests and policy dimensions; 
global war on terror implications; conflicting interests; and regional and extra-regional 
politics. 
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When the United States finally leaves Afghanistan, how will it affect South Asia’s 
regional stability in the following decade? On one hand, the following fictional news 
story does not seem so far-fetched:  
DAWN. Monday, October 7, 2026, Islamabad—Yesterday, Taliban 
fighters attacked a United Nations base near Kabul, Afghanistan. Dozens 
of improvised five kilometer-range rockets were deployed followed by a 
surge of suicide bombers, each carrying around 1,000 kilograms of 
explosives in trucks. Though most of the terrorists were killed in the blasts, 
those who fled the scene have little to fear from local authorities; the 
culprits behind the latest sequence of attacks have yet to be identified or 
arrested.  
Yesterday’s devastating attack falls on a political anniversary. Exactly 25 
years ago, the United States first invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the 
Taliban. The invasion came in retaliation for the nation harboring Osama 
Bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks, and as a means to eliminate further 
terrorist threats to the United States and increase global security. Ten 
years after the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces, however, the 
Taliban resurged, gaining control over the majority of Afghan provinces.  
Yesterday’s assault left unknown numbers of UN peacekeepers dead. 
States that lost personnel in the attack have formally posed the question on 
the populace’s mind: Will the UN once again react to force with force and 
allow coalition troops to overthrow the Taliban? Or, will the UN, too, 
abandon Afghanistan into lawlessness?  
Thus far, no law enforcement mechanism has worked to stabilize 
Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation and drug trafficking flourish while 
infrastructure and the education system suffer. The country’s prospects 
are bleak. Ever-worsening ethnic/tribal violence has escalated terrorism, 
destabilizing the entire region and burdening Afghanistan’s neighbor, 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s armed forces focus on stanching the violence at great 
cost to its institutions and to Pakistani society. Once again, thousands of 
refugees pour into Pakistan, fleeing the Taliban. Turmoil breeds further 
unrest within Pakistan and beyond, throughout South Asia. Prosperity 
across the region wanes, and peace seems ever more fragile. 
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On the other hand, if a few key events unfold differently—or rather, if decisions 
are promulgated effectively—Afghanistan and Pakistan may both mark a more optimistic 
anniversary:  
DAWN. Monday, October 7, 2026, Islamabad—Today, terrorists claimed 
responsibility for a minor blast outside the office of a non-governmental 
organization in the suburbs of Kabul, Afghanistan. No staff or civilian 
causalities have been reported. Four foreign human rights activists were 
taken hostage but were quickly freed, unharmed, by the Afghan Special 
Counter-terrorism Unit. The terrorists involved in the attack have been 
eliminated. 
The successful hostage recovery was championed by the Afghan National 
Security Forces and local law enforcement agencies, which have 
systematically and professionally overcome traditional ethnic rivalries in 
the region. After the successful withdrawal of U.S.-led forces in 2016, and 
with continuous global assistance—most notably from the United States 
and Pakistan—today Afghanistan has shown noteworthy growth in law 
enforcement, education, economy, infrastructure, and legitimate trade 
enhancement to curb opium production. 
This successfully countered attack is evidence of a more-or-less stable 
Afghanistan. The country’s newfound footholds have reduced the risk of 
spillover terrorism and regional turmoil in neighboring Pakistan.  
A positive and enduring outcome in Afghanistan cannot be left to chance or 
momentum. The question is this: Which current political variables will most impact the 
future of Afghanistan and its neighbors—particularly Pakistan? 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The [United Kingdom (UK)] defense secretary has once admitted that no 
one can predict what will happen to Afghanistan after British, U.S. and 
other NATO troops end their frontline role there at the end of 2014, and 
stressed that only the Afghan people can find a lasting solution to the 
country’s violence, corruption and lawlessness.1  
The Afghan people themselves are essential to their secure future. However, the 
steps toward a desirable future—from the global view as well as from Pakistan’s 
                                                 
1 Richard Norton and Sam Jones, “Afghanistan’s future after NATO troops leave uncertain, admits 
Hammond,” Guardian, April 10, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/10/afghanistan-future-
uncertain-hammond.  
 3 
perspective—begin with proper management of the ongoing situation in Afghanistan. 
With the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces “slowed” until the end of 2016, there are 
continually evolving variables that can affect the future prosperity of Afghanistan, 
regional security, and global terrorism.2 Major stakeholders, including India, Pakistan, 
and Iran, cannot pursue their interests in Afghanistan without considering the actions 
required for a best-case scenario. 
This thesis examines the factors that affect best-case and worst-case scenarios for 
Afghanistan’s future, particularly regarding such external influences as Pakistan. 
Specifically, this thesis asks: How can Pakistan best facilitate the future prosperity of 
Afghanistan while safeguarding its interests in the region?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
سیا یک پیکر آب و گل استآ  
 ملت افغان در آن پیکر دل است
آسیا از فساد او فساد  
 در گشاد او گشاد آسیا
 تا دل آزاد است آزاد است تن
 ورنہ کاہی در ره باد است تن
Asia is a living body, Afghanistan its heart, 
In the ruin of the heart lies the ruin of the body 
So long as the heart is free, the body remains free 
If not, it becomes a straw adrift in the wind. 
—Dr. Allama Muhammad Iqbal3 
 
Afghanistan is a land of diversity not only by its ethnic structure and current 
political map but also by its topography and climate. A landlocked country, Afghanistan 
                                                 
2 Greg Jaffe and David Nakamura, “Obama Agrees to Slow U.S. Troop Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan,” Washington Post, March 24, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-agrees-
to-slow-us-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/2015/03/24/6acd4834-d247-11e4-a62f-
ee745911a4ff_story.html?wprss=rss_whitehouse. 
3 Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), also known as Allama Iqbal, after studying in Cambridge, Munich, 
and Heidelberg became a philosopher, poet, and politician in British India who is widely regarded as 
having inspired the Pakistan Movement. November 9, his birthday, is celebrated as a national holiday in 
Pakistan. See http://www.khaama.com/allama-mohammad-iqbal.  
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lies at a critical geographic, strategic, historical, and cultural intersection of the Middle 
East, Central Asia, and South Asia; thus, the “literal sense of Iqbal’s poem is as true as 
the wisdom in his analogy, and today it is borne out by history.”4 Afghanistan has 
tempted invaders who wish to dominate the region, from Alexander the Great, to 
Tamerlane, to Sir William McNaughton, to Leonid Brezhnev’s Red Army. This has 
turned Iqbal’s “heart of Asia” into a battleground.  
Recently, the energy-rich Caspian basin’s enormous hydrocarbon reserves have 
furthered the region’s vast economic potential. Both neighboring and distant nations have 
plunged into a treasure hunt, or what has been referred to as the “New Great Game.” The 
history of Afghanistan reaches back into centuries—and is full of wars. As Jason 
Goodwin explains, “This is a region that has swallowed civilizations and sent the sands to 
seal them up. It has been dug, swindled and coerced, but what can change the fact that its 
deserts are as dry as ever, its mountains vast, and it is still a long way from the sea?”5 
“The nation of Afghanistan, however, has never really been a democratic state, 
and the concept of democracy is foreign one to the Afghan people. Their history is 
overwhelmingly dominated by examples of autocratic rule of kings, warlords, foreigners, 
and religious extremists.”6 When not fighting against foreign invaders, Afghans turned 
their weapons inward, and the struggles for domestic dominance were bloody and fierce. 
It was in a state of near-anarchy after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 that Al-Qaeda 
strengthened its base in the region alongside the Taliban. The groups posed grave 
challenges to regional stability and world peace, demonstrated perhaps most shockingly 
by the coordinated attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, with hijacked 
commercial airliners on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, Afghanistan’s role 
in the global political spectrum changed, and it became a high-priority target for major 
powers around the world. While the Taliban has since been driven from power and Al-
                                                 
4 Hamid Karzai, “Literal Sense of Iqbal’s Poem” (speech, Conference for Afghanistan: Security & 
Cooperation at the Heart of Asia in Istanbul, November 2, 2011), http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/4585. 
5 Jason Goodwin, “The Playing Fields of Asia,” The New York Times, January 9, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/09/books/the-playing-fields-of-asia.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.  
6 Dennis O. Young, “Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan,” 
October 2007, Strategic Studies Institute, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/8996/uploads. 
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Qaeda’s most prominent leaders have been captured or killed, Afghanistan continues to 
occupy a sensitive—and precarious—position in global strategic affairs and counter-
terrorism efforts.  
Enduring success in Afghanistan is mandatory for the United States and the West 
to maintain their credibility in the global community and, specifically, to ward off 
reemerging interests in the region from bordering countries Russia and China. Failure in 
Afghanistan would hand Al-Qaeda a propaganda tool to reconstitute the group’s 
capabilities and reclaim its global profile.7 This may further fuel yet another new lethal 
phenomenon: ISIS. The Central Asian Muslim republics would likely be radicalized by 
increasing religious extremism, which could further infect Pakistan. A more-or-less 
permanent “narco-state,” powered by homegrown Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements, could 
further threaten global security.8 Whatever form the next phase of U.S. involvement takes 
in Afghanistan, the outcome hinges on conditions on the ground—a lesson that 
Washington learned (or did not learn) the hard way in Iraq.9  
Owing to the looming fear of a failed Afghan state both regionally and globally, 
leaving Afghanistan to an undesirable fate is no longer an option. Broadly, this thesis 
argues that success in Afghanistan—for Afghans and their neighbors alike—entails 
establishing state-building measures, supremacy of law and human rights, rapid economic 
growth, and strong Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) who can encourage the 
Afghan public to accept the practices and preferences of stable democracy and good 
neighborly relations. 
                                                 
7 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s 
Longest War (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press: 2012), 97–100.  
8 English Oxford Living Dictionaries Online, s.v. “Narco,” accessed December 19, 2015, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/narco--; The Free Dictionary Online, s.v. 
“Narco-state,” accessed December 19, 2015,  http://www.thefreedictionary.com/narco-state.   
9 Dov S. Zakheim, A Vulcan’s Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, (Brookings Institution Press: June 1, 2011), 277–78; Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan 
Endgames, 98–99. 
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Ralph Waldo Emerson, an American essayist, once said, “People only see what 
they are prepared to see.”10 An optimistic and lasting outcome in Afghanistan cannot 
materialize out of thin air. Numerous factors and variables in play today will shape the 
future of Afghanistan and its neighbors, especially Pakistan. But, to borrow former U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s terminology, how can the global community 
master the many variables and imponderables, both known and unknown?11 This thesis 
presents three plausible scenarios for Afghanistan’s future: The Good, The Bad, and The 
Ugly. These scenarios do not predict the future in Afghanistan, but rather shed light on 
the factors and variables that will shape the postwar period. Examining such scenarios 
may allow strategic planners to develop alternative measures for complex situations—and 
Afghanistan is clearly a complex situation for all stakeholders. This research offers a 
promising approach for global powers and policymakers. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Afghanistan finds itself at a crossroads. Continued international security 
and economic assistance for 10 to 15 more years and sustained domestic 
leadership for reform will enable the country to build on achievements 
made since 2002 and become a success story in the region. The other 
option is to see Afghanistan slide back into its difficult past of instability 
and tension.12  
Geographically contiguous Pakistan has much in common with Afghanistan in 
terms of historic, ethno-linguistic, and socio-religious aspects. Pakistan has sacrificed 
much in the wake of counter-terrorism efforts, and will continue to be directly affected by 
                                                 
10 “Quotable Quotes,” Goodreads, last modified September 24, 2013, 
www.goodreads.com/quotes/50328.  
11 Rumsfeld made his famous remark—“There are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not 
know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks 
throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the 
difficult ones”—in the course of a press briefing on February 12, 2002. See 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636. It came in response to a question 
about Iraqi links to weapons of mass and terrorist organizations, that is, the justification for armed 
intervention in Iraq. Supporters and detractors of Rumsfeld alike seized on the “known unknown” comment 
to support their view of Rumsfeld and his policies. To the extent that strategic scenarios, as a planning tool, 
serve to move more variables in complex situations from the “unknown” category at least to the 
“knowable” category, Rumsfeld’s basic point applies to the methodology of the proposed thesis, as well. 
12 Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Building a New Afghanistan (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution 
Press/World Peace Foundation, February 27, 2007), 52.  
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a deteriorating Afghan security situation. More than any other Afghan neighbors, 
Pakistan has the most to lose and gain from Afghanistan’s next steps. The current 
situation offers a new opportunity for both countries and their mutual relations. 
Historically speaking, faith, geographic proximity as well as shared ethnicity, among 
other common interests are the key contours of Pakistan’s approach toward Afghanistan. 
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has sought to maintain pleasant and mutually 
beneficial relations with Afghanistan; however, “internal and external vested interests,” 
mainly post-Cold War, and cross-border terrorism have prevented their ties to fully 
develop. Going forward, Pakistan’s role will depend largely on the extent to which the 
Afghans accept their neighbor as a moderator of peace. 
At the same time,  
Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Pakistan, have long exploited its 
internal fragmentation and intergroup rivalry in order to advance their own 
strategic interests... At the moment, Afghanistan’s neighbors are 
somewhat neutralized by the presence of American and other allied forces 
and those of other partners of the coalition against terrorism. But they 
retain an intrusive capacity because of their proximity; entangled 
geopolitical and economic considerations both benefit and harm 
Afghanistan’s rebuilding process.13  
Neighboring countries’ policy choices determine future stability, peace, and 
reconciliation just as much as Afghan groups’ choices do. Among the countries that have 
direct interest in a stable, reconstructed Afghanistan are the Central Asian states, Iran, 
and Pakistan. India, being a non-bordering country, is seen with the indirect interests 
limited to trade partnership vis-à-vis encircling Pakistan by subduing its constructive role 
in Afghanistan. A peaceable and stable Afghan society with working government bodies 
and a revived economy would largely benefit all of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Stabilizing 
Afghanistan is a multidimensional project that requires constructive contribution from all 
the stakeholders with the ability to influence its security and internal politics.  
After the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, Pakistan foresees a serious 
security threat, without hoping for any diplomatic or materiel assistance in case of war 
                                                 
13 Craig Baxter, ed., Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society, (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, March 20, 2004), 50. 
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with India. There is little possibility that any such future Afghan government will remain 
impartial in such a conflict; instead; it might actively support India against Pakistan. And 
even more broadly, the bonds forged between India and Iran—or even possibly between 
the United States and India as they work together in Afghanistan—could well shape the 
Afghan end game poorly for Pakistan. The strategic, security, political, and economic 
implications for Pakistan could, in turn, lead to instability in the region and further long-
term disruption in Afghanistan. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several factors inform the problems and resolutions in Afghanistan. Among them 
are the unsettled ethnic situation within the country, the fraught history of Afghanistan as 
a destination of choice for invaders, regional interests that sometimes compete or conflict 
in catastrophic ways, and U.S. policy before and during the “longest war,” including the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. These variables inform the hypothesized scenarios in 
the later part of thesis and, thus, this literature review carefully considers relevant 
scholarship on each factor. 
1. Myth of Conquest in Afghanistan 
Professor Toynbee, a British historian (1889–1975), wrote on Afghanistan in his 
innovative work, A Study of History. For an invader, Toynbee explains, “it is easy to get 
into Afghanistan but very difficult to get out.”14 The “graveyard of empires” trope may or 
may not be helpful—or completely accurate—but Toynbee’s warning resonates in the 
country’s current situation.15 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla also endorse Afghanistan’s 
legacy as the “graveyard of empires,” at least to the extent that its people have become 
                                                 
14Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History: Vol. 1: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, ed. D.C. Somervell 
(New York: Oxford University Press, December 10, 1987), 415. 
15 The quote refers to a widely circulated (and widely quoted) article—Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, 
Graveyard of Empires,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-
empires?page=show book. The image has been dismissed as a cliché by several other scholars of the 
subject. See, for example, the comments in Barry Neild, “Is Afghanistan Really a ‘Graveyard of the 
Empires’?” CNN World, December 7, 2009, available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/07/afghanistan.graveyard/index.html. 
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practiced at enduring regular and irregular warfare in the past three decades.16 Dmitry 
Yazov, the former Soviet defense minister who pulled Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 
1989, noted of his experience: 
We did not try to win. We wanted to help but not everyone accepted our 
help so we left. … Moscow badly misjudged struggle for Afghan hearts 
and minds. … The main lesson was that the Afghan people did not support 
the presence of Soviet forces, although they welcomed material help. We 
were uninvited guests and our presence did not cement society but divided 
it. … We did not understand what Islam as a religion was, and who really 
was in charge of villages, the local Muslims.17 
In this sense, Afghanistan’s “curse” has served as a self-fulfilling prophecy in the 
contemporary context, which puts a special charge to the issues of resolving and restoring 
Afghanistan. 
2. Inside Afghanistan  
Any effort to find a solution for the complex Afghan situation must begin by 
examining Afghanistan’s socio-political history. Thomas Barfield, a leading 
anthropologist and expert on Afghanistan affairs who has studied the Afghan–Pakistan 
region for more than four decades, demonstrates in his book Afghanistan: A Cultural and 
Political History how Afghans have endured continuous struggle amid social and 
political chaos. Some of this chaos was somewhat by design; the only way the Afghans 
could free their country of the Russians was to make it “ungovernable.”18 After driving 
out the Russians, however, the Afghans have since been unable to govern themselves.19 
After the expected U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2016, a governing mechanism 
that lasts for decades cannot be devised without taking into account the shared interests of 
the Afghan people. Several years of diplomatic talks with the Taliban show that the 
                                                 
16 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames (2012), xi-xii; Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A 
Cultural and Political History (New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 255.  
17 Adam Tanner, “We did not Try to Win: We Wanted to Help but not Everyone Accepted our help so 
we left,” Reuters, (Moscow, November 9, 2001); Muhammad Mehboob Qadir, “The End State of U.S. War 
in Afghanistan-Possibilities and Options,” Opinion: Defence Journal, September 2002, 
http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/sept/endstate.htm. 
18 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 7.  
19 Ibid., 13.  
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political complexity in Afghanistan has even compelled the United States to have 
discussions with its core enemy there.20  
This chaos is exacerbated by Afghanistan’s internal ethnic divisions. For instance, 
Barfield quotes the statement of Pakistani activist Abdul Wali Khan in the 1970s, 
responding to a question about his loyalty to Pakistan: “I have been Pakistani for thirty 
years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun (Pathan) for five thousand 
years.”21 This statement exemplifies the Pashtuns’ constant struggle with their ethnic 
identity, whether they are in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Though the same can be said for 
other ethnic minorities, especially in Afghanistan, this sentiment is widely articulated in 
the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, which holds that Pashtun is not a form of ethnicity but 
rather a “state of mind” that drives the Pashtuns’ code of conduct.  
3. Regional Considerations  
India, Iran, and Pakistan are pursuing their interests in Afghanistan through their 
proxies in order to gain trade, political, and economic advantages after the withdrawal of 
U.S.-led forces in 2016—or at least to secure a better position at the negotiation table.22 
India, being interested in the Central Asian states, was already working hard to establish a 
trade link via Iran and Afghanistan.23 This move by India served many needs: First, to 
have land access to Central Asia for economic expansion. Second, India seeks to outflank 
Pakistan both militarily and economically and prevent Pakistan from achieving strategic 
depth with a stable Afghanistan. Third, India supports the establishment of any 
government in Afghanistan that is anti-Pakistan.24 John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein agree 
                                                 
20 Matthew Rosenberg and Alissa J. Rubin, “Taliban Step toward Afghan Peace Talks Is Hailed by 
U.S.,” New York Times: June 18, 2013.  
21 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 21.  
22 Tahir Nazir, “Afghanistan’s Endgame Is India’s Dilemma – Analysis,” Eurasia Review Journal, 
January 26, 2013, http://www.eurasiareview.com/26012013-afghanistans-endgame-is-indias-dilemma-
analysis/. 
23 William Dalrymple, “A Deadliest Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan & India,” June 25, 2013, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-pakistan-india-
c?cid=gADs_Articles_Search-Articles-DT-US_25451961275&gclid=CJ-38Iv9gbkCFa9_QgodQUgAdA. 
24 Ibid.; Editorial, “Quarterly Review,” Pakistan Defense Journal, (Rawalpindi: October–December 
1999), 3. 
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that, whatever comes out of the “Afghan end game,” India’s involvement in Afghanistan 
will continue this trend, to Pakistan’s detriment.25 Ultimately, Pakistan’s role in 
Afghanistan will be directly affected by its ability to cultivate a friendly government.  
Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan, especially in the postwar period, has been crucial 
but contentious. It was expected that an indebted Afghan nation would become a 
protectorate of Pakistan.26 Some even hoped that Afghanistan would eventually 
confederate with Pakistan.27 While the principal historical cause of the disillusionment 
between the two states remained due to the unsettled issue of the Durand Line,28 
rigidities are also derived from divergent strategies and unlike national ethos.  
The concept of strategic depth for Pakistan has not just been about acquiring 
military space; more broadly, Pakistan has sought to undermine “Afghan nationalism” in 
the form of Pashtunistan. To that extent, Pakistan seems to have achieved its purpose—
concerns about the Pashtunistan issue have virtually disappeared, especially after the rise 
of the Taliban.29 However, authors such as Arquilla and Rothstein argue that Pakistan’s 
support for Pashtun extremists or insurgents in Afghanistan—given in order to prevent 
India from generating greater influence inside Afghanistan—could trap Pakistan in war at 
two fronts.30 Pakistan has become a  main stakeholder in the Afghan end game, though 
not in the role that it might have hoped, which is evident through incidents like the 
“killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by NATO forces,” the Osama Bin Laden operation, or 
the initiation of the Afghanistan peace process without Pakistan’s inclusion.31 Likewise, 
                                                 
25 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan, 6.  
26Monthly Journal of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Vol. XXIII No. 5, August 
1999, 719–747. 
27 Ibid.; Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan, 6. 
28  “The Durand Line, the western border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was delineated in 1893 
as the boundary between then British India and Afghanistan. The international community recognizes the 
Durand line as the Pak-Afghan border since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, but successive Afghan rulers 
have repudiated its legitimacy.” See Tariq Mahmood, “The Durand Line: South Asia’s Next Trouble Spot” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2005). 
29 Monthly Journal of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 719–747. 
30 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan, 6.  
31 Tahir Nazir, “Afghanistan’s Endgame Is India’s Dilemma— Analysis.”   
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the unremitting “U.S. and Afghanistan blame game pushed Pakistan into a corner.”32 In 
the eyes of some policymakers, not letting Pakistan exercise a major role in Afghan 
affairs was a risk that “might spark an internal social revolution—perhaps the true 
objective of al-Qaeda’s ‘deep game.’”33  
4. U.S. Involvement  
The Global War on Terror (GWOT), particularly in the Afghanistan Theater, has 
lasted twice as long as World War II. It has cost $546 billion and 3,083 U.S. and allied 
soldiers’ lives, not to mention injuries and disabilities or Afghan casualties.34 And yet, 
for all this expenditure of blood and money, the ultimate aim of the war in Afghanistan 
may still be out of reach. Dov S. Zakheim, in his book A Vulcan’s Tale, states that “the 
war in Afghanistan will not be lost by the military, but it cannot be won by the military 
either.”35 The author demonstrates the problems with postwar reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan by comparing them to the U.S. policies that prevailed during the Iraq war. 
Because Zakheim served as the Pentagon’s comptroller, Department of Defense (DOD) 
chief financial officer, and coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction, he had insight 
into the running costs in both conflicts and direct access to the most senior policymakers 
in the DOD and the White House.36 Thus, he provides an insider’s view not only of U.S. 
and allied strategy in Afghanistan but also of the realities of its implementation. Overall, 
Zakheim’s account remains useful in explaining the impact the United States’ decisions 
after 9/11 had on subsequent outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq.37  
John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein have a similar opinion about U.S. policymakers 
and their negligence toward Afghanistan while Iraq was invaded in 2003: “It became the 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames, 7.  
34 Iftekhar A. Chowdhury and Shahid J. Burki, “Afghanistan after America: Possible Post-Drawdown 
Scenarios,” ISAS Insights, No. 17, (National University of Singapore, August 8, 2012), 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=151381; Erik Brattberg, Europe, 
Afghanistan, and The Transatlantic Relationship After 2014, (Sweden: SIPRI, May 2013), 1. 
35 Zakheim, A Vulcan’s Tale, 277.  
36 Ibid., xi.  
37 Ibid., 277.  
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‘other war’ within policymaking circles and our commitment to this campaign became 
unclear.”38 Even after 2003, and until today, it has remained a dilemma to develop a 
consistent and realistic “endgame strategy” for favorable results in a COIN campaign. 
Rothstein and Arquilla explain: 
The striking initial American victory in the fall of 2001, which drove the 
Taliban and Al-Qaida from power with less than two hundred Special 
Forces soldiers working with a few thousand friendly tribesmen, was 
followed by almost nine years of policies and actions on the ground that 
resulted in deteriorating security conditions. Each new approach taken by 
the United States and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allies 
did little to thwart Al-Qaida and the Taliban.39  
Foreign troops were welcomed by the Afghan public as liberators at first, much 
like the Soviets were in the 1970s. Presently, however, the United States has failed to 
meet Afghan citizens’ needs—security, economic revival, and normalcy.40 This story—
ending a military campaign with something less than victory—has some history in the 
U.S. experience, from Vietnam to Iraq, and now from Afghanistan to ISIS, which 
occupies great stretches of what used to be “sorted-out” Iraq. Thomas H. Johnson and M. 
Chris Mason note:  
Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insurgency that 
mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. … At the operational 
level, the Taliban is fighting a classic “war of the flea,” while the 
Coalition continues to fight the war largely according to the Taliban 
“game plan.” This is resulting in its losing the war in Afghanistan one 
Pashtun village at a time. … At the strategic level, the Taliban is fighting a 
classic “war of the flea,” largely along the same lines used by the 
mujahedeen twenty years ago against the Soviets, including fighting in 
villages to deliberately provoke air strikes and collateral damage. They 
gladly trade the lives of a few dozen guerrilla fighters in order to cost the 
American forces the permanent loyalty of that village, under the code of 
Pashtun social behavior called Pashtunwali and its obligation for revenge 
(Badal), which the U.S. Army does not even begin to understand. The 
                                                 
38 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames, 3.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 7–8.  
 14 
advent of suicide attacks is particularly alarming. The Taliban is getting 
American forces to do exactly what they want them to do.41  
5. Counterinsurgency 
In Afghanistan, the U.S. approach of “leadership decapitation” on an “industrial 
scale” in the past few years was taken up by the U.S. military commanders—first by 
General Stanley McChrystal and then David Petraeus. McChrystal and Petraeus both 
adopted COIN with a fervor that belies their understanding of the tactic, its origins in the 
colonial wars of the 19th-century great powers, and its tragic legacy for the societies 
behind all sides of these “small” but brutal wars42—much less its dim prospects for a 
brighter Afghanistan. Professor Douglas Porch highlights the COIN dilemma that has 
prevailed over the last two centuries in practices by three great powers, France, Britain, 
and the United States. Historically, Porch finds, “moral costs” were much higher and 
longer lasting than the sporadic “ephemeral tactical success” of earlier COIN operations 
by other names, as in the case of Britain in Ireland from the 1920s onward, or in the 
1950s in Algeria.43  
Various moral justifications for short-lived tactical achievements or failures—
such as the strategic void in the U.S. COIN strategy—were evident in the May 2012 
Decade of War after-action report, which illustrated undesired outcomes as the result of 
battle-space owners’ poor management.44 To Porch, despite their legitimate 
justifications, U.S. policies that settled on drone attacks or Special Operations Forces’ 
(SOFs) operations in the name of COIN formed and spread anti-American sentiments, 
                                                 
41 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Research Institute. (Elsevier Limited: winter 2007). 71, 87, 
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/docs/pubs/understanding%20the%20taliban%20and%20insurgency%20i
n%20afghanistan.pdf,. 
42 Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” 
Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18, September 3, 2007, 340, 
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/Small_Wars_%20Pub.pdf.  
43 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 119.  
44 Ibid., 345; Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War: Enduring Lessons 
from the Past Decade of Operations, Volume I, June 15, 2012, 22, http://blogs.defensenews.com/saxotech-
access/pdfs/decade-of-war-lessons-learned.pdf.  
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and even roiled the strategic partnership with Pakistan.45 In a nutshell, Porch believes the 
resurgence of the Taliban after their complete defeat by allied forces in 2001 is blowback 
from the improper execution—and faulty conception—of COIN.  
There is no denying the fact that “classic COIN doctrine requires winning the 
hearts and minds of the ingenious population.”46 But, as Porch apprehends, “‘Hearts and 
minds’ has never been a recipe for lasting stability.”47 Rather, “past counterinsurgency 
campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing 
societies while unsettling civil-military relations.”48 In other words, COIN approaches 
calculated to win the hearts and minds of “foreign folks” unvaryingly depend on 
“coercion rather than persuasion.”49 
Since the advent of the new COIN strategy in 2007, though attacks on civilian and 
security forces have diminished, the “Afghanistan,” conflict was spread to the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. In 2011, the Taliban insurgency had 
moved far beyond its traditional stronghold provinces in the south and southeast into the 
center of Afghanistan.50 In 2012, the Taliban was implicated in insurgent activities in 
almost 80 percent of Afghanistan.51 Professor Johnson further muses, 
While the lack of Afghan state-building and reconstruction and the failure 
of Kabul to reconcile with the rural Pashtun peoples of the south and east 
of the country have all been critical factors in the re-emergence of the 
Taliban, these factors alone do not explain how the Taliban have been able 
to capture the imagination of large swaths of Pashtun areas with a 
resonating message of violent extremism. How has the Taliban been able 
                                                 
45 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency, 345.  
46 Ibid., 188.  
47 Ibid., i. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid., xii.  
50 Jayshree Bajoria, “Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relation, Oct 6, 2011, 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.  
51 Shehzad H. Qazi, “The ‘Neo-Taliban’ and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” Third World 
Quarterly, March 31, 2010, 486–487. 
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to re-emerge when only a few years ago it seemed destined for the trash 
bin of history?52 
COIN is a big part of this development, and it will continue to have ramifications in the 
Afghan state and society. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines various variables and factors that will lead to anticipated 
strategic scenarios. Specifically, it follows the “tracking, analyzing, imaging, deciding 
and acting” (TAIDA) framework presented by Mats Lindgren and Hans Bandhold in their 
book, Scenario Planning: The Link between Future and Strategy.53 “Tracking” identifies 
variables and signs of threats and opportunities. “Analyzing” illustrates significances and 
engenders scenarios. “Imaging” generates options and anticipated results. The 
“Deciding” phase articulates the information and classifies varieties and strategies. 
Finally, “Acting” sets up short- and long-term goals, steps to take, and follow-up 
actions.54  
This thesis examines some of the myriad variables that will contribute to 
Afghanistan’s likely state in 2026, at the end of the “transformation decade” following 
the U.S. withdrawal from—or “consolidation” in—Afghanistan in 2016. To show how 
these variables will affect the real-life situation, this thesis installs three hypothetical 
scenarios: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. These scenarios, all from Pakistan’s 
perspective, are based on the work of military scholars and journalists including Asad 
Munir, Iftekhar A. Chowdhury, Muhammad Khurshid Khan, and Seema Mustafa; as well 
                                                 
52 Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah,” 318. 
53 Mats Lindgren and Hans Bandhold, Scenario Planning: the Link between Future and Strategy, 
second edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 39. It also uses Kees Van der Heijden, Scenarios: 
The Art of Strategic Conversation, (UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), second edition, esp. 53–55.  
54 Mats Lindgren and Hans Bandhold, Scenario Planning, 39. 
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as a post-seminar report of National Defence University at Islamabad.55 The scenarios 
explore, broadly, three possible outcomes stemming from the next steps in Afghanistan, 
from Pakistan’s viewpoint. The scenarios are all informed by the same baseline 
conditions, which include the following: 
• The conflicting interests or opposing strategies of major players in the 
region (Pakistan, India, Iran, the United States, China, etc.) 
• The political/military transition of the Afghan government after the U.S. 
withdrawal  
• The state of terrorism in Afghanistan and the region 
• The continued presence of foreign forces 
• The state of regional stability 
• Regional alliances 
• The impact of outstanding regional disputes and politics 
• The impact of the unresolved border between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(the Durand Line) 
• Reconstruction, economic conditions, and trade, particularly as it pertains 
to Pakistan’s involvement 
• The state of security forces (law enforcement agencies including the 
police, intelligence agencies, and military infrastructure) 
• Drug trafficking 
• Dependence on foreign aid/support 
                                                 
55 Asad Munir (a retired brigadier, who has served at senior intelligence postings in Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa and FATA areas of Pakistan) “Post Exit-Afghanistan—Pak Scenarios” The Express Tribune, 
November 24, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/470744/post-exit-af-pak-scenarios/; Iftekhar A. 
Chowdhury and Shahid J. Burki, “Afghanistan after America: Possible Post-Drawdown Scenarios,” 
(National University of Singapore, 2012); Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Projected Security Environments 
of Pakistan in Post-Afghanistan War Scenario,” IPRI Journal XI, No. 2 (Summer 2011): 102–121, 
http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/art5khus11.pdf; Seema Mustafa, “Post-withdrawal 
Scenario in Afghanistan,” (Express Tribune, May 17, 2013), http://tribune.com.pk/story/550670/post-
withdrawal-scenario-in-afghanistan/; ). Post Seminar Report, “Afghanistan End Game: Quest for Peace and 
Stability,” Institute for Strategic Studies: Research and Analysis (ISSRA), (Islamabad, National Defense 
University: June 27, 2012), 15, 
http://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/Seminars/PSRAfghanistanSeminar.pdf. 
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• The Afghans’ initiative in taking their country out of darkness 
• The Taliban factor, as a matter of culture and governance among Pashtun 
communities  
• The continued role or influence of Al-Qaeda, and now ISIS  
The scenarios reflect three different ways the present set of circumstances could 
unfold in Afghanistan after the 2016 U.S. withdrawal. The Good scenario (less likely), 
The Bad scenario (most likely), and The Ugly scenario (less likely) are most notably 
explored from Pakistan’s perspective, on the bases of various domestic/local variables 
and under the broad umbrella of regional and extra-regional factors. The scenarios largely 
depend upon Afghanistan’s political future, economic revival, and self-sustainment—
including the ANSF’s ability to maintain credibility and deter insurgents, thereby 
maintaining writ of the Afghan government. The scenarios are developed by examining 
several factors: the criticality of the Afghan issue throughout history; Afghanistan’s 
indigenous facts and prospects; Pak–Afghan cross-interests and policy dimensions; 
GWOT implications; conflicting interests; regional and extra-regional politics; and 
paradigms of profound imperatives, such as the United States’, and those presented in the 
Brookings Institute report, A Deadliest Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan & India.56  
Each of the scenarios identifies the implications for Pakistan and determines the 
actions necessary to steer toward The Good scenario. Better outcomes (The Good 
scenario) could arise from reconciliation and power sharing if all the actors, including the 
Taliban and other regional and extra-regional stakeholders, come to a strategic stalemate. 
Some counter-terrorism (CT) troops will be necessary for moral, materiel, or supervisory 
support to the ANSF after 2016, until political harmony is achieved through a peaceful 
process. Once the ANSF can hold on its own against the insurgency, foreign monetary 
support should continue until there is a sustainable economic revival in Afghanistan, thus 
allowing the country to gradually reform its institutions and educational setup. 
On the other hand, The Bad scenario (and the one currently most likely) has 
already begun with partial success in the political peace process, and a smooth transition 
                                                 
56 William Dalrymple, “A Deadliest Triangle.”   
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after the 2016 withdrawal of U.S. forces. From there, a reasonably legitimate Afghan 
government was emerged and apparently accepted by most state actors. The Taliban, 
however, has maintained footprints in the country throughout the partial withdrawal of 
U.S. forces. After U.S. withdrawal, foreign forces should, refrain from influencing 
Afghanistan’s internal politics in order to avoid further consequences. In this scenario, 
some steps are taken toward economic revival and partial foreign aid is reimbursed as 
promised; economic sustainability is foreseeable in the near future. 
The Ugly scenario (less likely) would be the consequence of stakeholders 
handling Afghan affairs inharmoniously—for instance, if a situation arises that compels 
the United States to completely withdraw forces (“Zero Option”) toward the end of 2016. 
Despite foreign support, the ANSF will dissolve and the entire security structure will 
unravel. The Taliban will consequently recapture power; Afghanistan will erupt in 
complete chaos and civil war; the United States will acknowledge its strategic failure in 
the complete abandonment of Afghanistan. Of course, no stakeholders want Afghanistan 
to emerge in this state, regressing to its state in the late ’90s. 
So the challenge is evident: how all players—especially the United States and 
Pakistan, prime players and stakeholders should proceed together—to reach The Good 
scenario, or at least The Bad, and to avoid The Ugly.  
Each scenario is tested by examining it against rational and likely outcomes, such 
as the resurgence of terrorism; economic deprivation in an already fragile economy 
through any natural disaster or crop failure; and mass corruption or disruption of foreign 
aid/support. First, it is determined what steps, if any, can be taken now or in the near 
future to mitigate the effects of such strains on the emergent Afghan state. The analysis 
then discusses the likelihood of a successful Afghan transition—as measured from Kabul, 
Islamabad, and Washington.  
A variety of sources inform this methodology, including after-action reports, 
Congressional Review Service (CRS) documents from the United States, declassified 
material, and government reports or statements from government personnel. Secondary 
sources include scholarly journals, policy papers, and newspaper articles, as well as 
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books and resources that discuss the Afghanistan–Pakistan region in general and the 
2014–2016 transition, evolving geopolitical scenario, power game, and the future aspects 
of Afghan transformation after the U.S. withdrawal. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND REGIONAL ASPECTS 
It was in a state of near-anarchy after the Soviet withdrawal, and during civil war, 
that Al-Qaeda strengthened its base in Afghanistan beside the Taliban. Al-Qaeda’s 
attacks on September 11, 2001, posed further challenges to regional stability and global 
peace. The British Foreign Secretary described 9/11 while shedding light on the future of 
Afghanistan, stating, “Few events in global history can have galvanized the international 
system to action so completely in so short a time.”57 The terrorists’ acts in the United 
States marked a transition in world affairs as well as a turning point in the modern history 
of Afghanistan; the terror attacks ascribed Afghanistan an enhanced role in the global 
political spectrum, and turned into a high-priority issue for major powers around the 
world. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States led a far-reaching multinational military 
and political campaign to root out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, restore peace and security, 
and initiate the re-construction process in Afghanistan. While the Taliban has since been 
driven from power and Al-Qaeda’s most prominent leaders have been captured or killed, 
Afghanistan continues to occupy a sensitive—and precarious—position in global 
strategic affairs and counter-terrorism efforts. At this juncture, Pakistan has once again 
become a frontline state by assisting the United States in operations against terrorism.  
When the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan was launched more than a decade ago, it 
apparently intended to overcome three broad challenges: First, to defeat the Taliban and 
limit Al-Qaeda; second, to bring economic sustainability for lasting reductions in poppy 
cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption—considered a major source of 
revenue for the terrorists; and third, to train Afghan security forces, including police, 
army, and intelligence, to better deal with the country’s long-term threats. Unfortunately, 
despite the considerable expenditure of time, effort, and resources, these goals seem as 
elusive today as they did in 2001.  
                                                 
57 Jack Straw, “Future of Afghanistan” (British foreign secretary’s speech, International Institute of 
Strategic Studies in London, October 22, 2001), 
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Despite billions of dollars in aid, Kabul’s inability to deal with its corrupt and 
inefficient governing structures has landed Afghanistan on spot 166 of 167 in a 2015 
transparency survey.58 The extreme level of corruption in the country is likely to affect 
the sustainability of foreign aid assistance for economic growth and the development of 
sources and rebuilding/construction activities after 2016.59 The judicial system’s inability 
to implement the rule of law exacerbates the insurgents’ hegemony and state of law and, 
consequently, embeds Afghanistan in warlordism. The booming drug trade and the 
influence of drug tycoons on various stakeholders give the lie to all anti-opium 
pronouncements. Weak institutions continue to plague the fledgling state. 
The slow reconstruction process has frustrated all involved. The presence of large 
numbers of foreign forces antagonizes local populations, and the continued killing of 
innocent civilians exacerbates tensions. Because donors have been unable to live up to 
their commitments, significant projects remain incomplete. The coercive strategies of 
neighboring countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Iran, emphasize short-term and often 
zero-sum ends rather than an organic regional plan. Law enforcement agencies have been 
unable to implement the writ of the Afghan government and stop the rapidly deteriorating 
law-and-order situation, stymying civil development before it can even start.  
A. PAKISTAN’S VIEW OF AFGHANISTAN 
Pakistan, among all the states in the region, withstands the worst of the ill effects 
of the Afghan security situation. Historic and geographic contiguity; shared ethno-
linguistic ties and cultural; faith and other common interests are the leading “factors 
driving Pakistan’s approach” toward Afghanistan.60 The countries’ geographic proximity 
has significant implications for their security and economic prosperity. It is evident from 
the history that stability in the region remains a condition for Afghanistan’s politico-
                                                 
58 In 2015 Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 166th out of 167 countries in its annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index; Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” 1 Feb, 
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59 Ibid. 
60 Talal Hassan, “Afghanistan Complex Situation and its Implications on Pakistan,” (Sweden, Malmö 
University Electronic Publishing: 2009), 
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economic stability, as Afghanistan lies on a major crossroad between South and Central 
Asia. In such a sensitive situation, Pakistan’s future role is largely dependent on the 
extent of its acceptance by the Afghans as a moderator of peace.  
1. A Friendly Afghanistan: A Strategic Compulsion for Pakistan 
“Pakistan’s past, present, and future are closely linked with Afghanistan. A 
peaceful, united, and stable Afghanistan is critical for Pakistan’s security and is a top 
policy objective. At the same time, Pakistan must prevent the opening of another hostile 
front should Afghanistan emerge as a proxy for India.”61 This section describes the 
strategic objectives Pakistan seeks in Afghanistan.  
a. Security Concerns  
The restoration of peace in Afghanistan undeniably has great relevance to 
Pakistan’s strategic interests in the region. India seeks to interrupt Pakistan’s friendly ties 
with Afghanistan and, consequently, to negate any chances of Pakistan gaining strategic 
depth. To this end, India has always promoted an anti-Pakistan government in 
Afghanistan, “discrediting Pakistan as a terrorist state,” hindering Pakistan’s access to 
Central Asia, and pouring its agents through the western border to instigate insurgency in 
the Province of Baluchistan, and turbulence in cities like Karachi.62  
Pakistan has secured its 2,204-kilometer-long western border with Afghanistan 
without deploying regular troops, thus has the opportunity to use those troops against any 
Indian venture on its eastern front, if necessary. Otherwise, committing a sizeable force 
along this border will significantly drain Pakistan’s military. With military and resource 
capacity in mind, friendly western borders are critical to Pakistan’s security, which also 
requires a pleasant government in Kabul. Furthermore, harmony in Afghanistan is 
essential to lasting stability in Pakistan, along with many other regional factors, such as 
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bringing calmness in Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) agendas, and weapon flow.63 
Pakistan’s first concern, therefore, is making sure Afghanistan does not pose a threat; this 
factor shapes the major contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan.64  
b. Strategic Depth 
In an interview, Former President General Pervez Musharraf once said, “These 
are old theories. After India and Pakistan have become nuclear powers, if anyone 
perceives that one would try to get some strategic gains, it would be a sheer folly. It is not 
possible now that we will be overrun and will go to Afghanistan for strategic depth.”65 
These remarks reflect a common understanding that Pakistan will displace its strategic 
assets to Afghanistan if needed, but this may not happen. However, since September 11, 
the “sacrifice” or loss of strategic depth has become a benchmark in Pakistan’s “security 
doctrine and Kashmir policy.” The importance of loss or gain in this area can be 
understood by reviewing the geneses of strategic depth in last two decades, and the 
results for Pakistan. 
Mirza Aslam Baig and General Zia-ul-Haq, ex-chiefs of the Pakistan Army, are 
attributed with the invention of the term “strategic depth” in the early 1980s: 
Theoretically stated, it was a proactive defensive strategy of securing 
“Islamic Depth” in the west to counterbalance the conventionally superior 
“Hindu India” by strengthening diplomatic and military relations with 
Afghanistan and the Arab world to the extent that in the worst-case 
scenario of India invading and overrunning Pakistan, the Army High 
Command could relocate westwards and use Afghanistan as a frontline 
ally from which to roll back Indian “expansionism.”66 
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Conception or level of sway, in Pakistan security doctrine may differ from past to 
present, but the term still exits for Pakistan.67 
c. Economic Benefits 
Pakistan and Afghanistan rely on each other strategically for lasting economic 
expansion. Afghanistan, a landlocked country, depends on Pakistan’s transit trade route 
through the sea and direct access to the outside world, whereas Pakistan needs 
Afghanistan to exploit natural energy and a trade corridor to the noncoastal Central Asian 
Republics (CARs)—having recently joined the global economic system with a 
tremendous amount of energy resources (oil and natural gas), Afghanistan offers a 
gateway to a “new Silk Road.” Both countries could help bringing the CARs out of their 
“decades of isolation,” while also gaining their own economic benefits. A stable and 
friendly Afghanistan is needed to actualize the dream of the new Silk Road, and to 
contribute to Pakistan’s vision.68 A stable and friendly Afghanistan would also provide 
the West an opportunity to access more energy resources to meet their future needs rather 
than relying on control of the “Pakistan–Afghanistan corridor”; “this was probably a far 
more important strategic role than that Pakistan played during the Cold War years.”69  
2. Historic Dimensions of Pak–Afghan Relations and Policy Review  
Pak–Afghan relations commenced with the chaotic issue of Pashtunistan, when 
King Mohammed Zahir Shah’s government voted against Pakistan in the United Nations 
after gaining its independence in 1947. This issue remained alive with varied intensity 
mainly until 1977–78, resulting in border clashes, closure of diplomatic missions, and 
discontinuation of Afghan transit trade. This last act consequently took Afghanistan 
enormously close to the Soviets, which later came with grave consequences. The 
countries’ foreign policy dealings may not be a true success story, but they have reached 
some agreements. Pakistan adopted a defensive policy to ensure a friendly Afghanistan 
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for stability on its western border. Despite hiccups, Pakistan resultantly did not face two-
front situations during both its wars with India. This achievement may be attributed to the 
fact that Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan was not focused entirely on its 
own internal political dynamics, nor did the sole interest of any external player influence 
or shape the situation for a greater gain.70 
During the mid-‘70s, both sides came close to reconciling the Durand Line issue. 
Internal political changes in Afghanistan, however, coupled with Soviet involvement and 
the infrequent interest of the United States influenced the delicate political arrangement 
that prevailed in Pakistan. Thus, the policy remained focused on narrow objectives. The 
goal of attaining “strategic depth” caused much chaos. Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan further altered the dynamics of Pak–Afghan relations. During the Soviet 
invasion, Pakistan was the primary channel for logistics support to Afghan Mujahedeen 
(freedom fighters), which became unfavorably vital for Afghanistan.71 The convergence 
of interests between Pakistan and the United States helped to contain the Soviet threat 
and subsequently forced their retreat. After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan’s sub-
imperial agenda in Afghanistan had a vital Saudi connection. Afghanistan became the 
battleground for a proxy war between Shiite Iran and Sunni Wahhabi Islam, propagated 
by Saudi Arabia and supported by Pakistan. This proxy war for influence 
continues today.72  
When the Taliban emerged in 1994, Pakistan viewed the Taliban as the only 
entity in Afghanistan capable of restoring the peace in the wake of the war with 
Soviets.73 After the Taliban established its government in Kabul in 1996, in order to 
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secure its western borders, Pakistan formally recognized the Taliban; this had many 
serious future implications for Pakistan.74  
A new situation emerged after 9/11 and the region’s political scene dramatically 
changed. The Taliban’s retreat brought Pakistan’s ambitions to an end, and its foreign 
policy collapsed. When Pakistan’s foreign policy in Afghanistan turned out to be 
counterproductive for its own national security, Pakistan then made a strategic turn. 
Pakistan had to re-align its policy with the international community to safeguard vital 
national interests. Influenced by post-9/11 U.S. policies, Pakistan emerged as the front-
line state to support the international effort to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s policy guidelines primarily consisted of ceasing diplomatic relations with the 
Taliban government; unconditionally supporting U.S. war efforts against Al-Qaeda; and 
hunting down Al-Qaeda operatives and denying refuge to any of its members.75 Post-
9/11 Afghanistan has been the cornerstone of Pakistan policies. Indeed, when Pakistan 
was coerced into joining the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, Pakistan’s then-
president, General Pervez Musharraf, insisted that Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan 
was being “sacrificed” to such “critical concerns” as the “cause of Kashmir.”76 On 
September 19, 2001, he said during his speech on national television, “I have done 
everything for Afghanistan and the Taliban when the whole world was against them. We 
are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to them.”77  
Because of the “buffer status” Afghanistan gained from the “19th-century colonial 
rivalry between the British and the Czarist empires”—known as the “Great Game”—
Afghanistan, while safeguarding its independence, has diligently evaded the temptations 
of foreign impulses. Pakistan, on the other hand, has remained dependent on external 
alliances to ensure its security. The dependency in Pakistan’s foreign policy thus makes 
an obvious difference to “Afghanistan’s image as a fiercely independent people and 
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country.” Pakistan has remained a victim of its geography and incomplete partition since 
independence. The legacy of Kashmir has always been dominant in its foreign policy. 
Consequently, jihad, in all its shapes and forms, thrived to its limit and became an 
instrument of its foreign policy. Alongside Kashmir, Pakistan also suffered due to its 
strategic location—by being a close ally of the West during every watershed event 
throughout history, whether supporting the United States against the former USSR in 
Afghanistan, or being a front-line adversary against terrorists in the Global War on 
Terror.  
Pakistan’s present policy regarding Afghanistan has earned a place for the country 
in the League of Nations, especially with the United States. Pakistan’s political and 
economic gains in Afghanistan, however, remain unfocused; thus, Pakistan has continued 
to fall short of its objectives. Afghanistan has since returned to the mainstream of the 
international system, but both Pakistan and Afghanistan must still regenerate their 
bilateral relations with cautious optimism.78  
In the context of its transitioning relationship with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s 
national vital interests are, in sum, to attain: (1) a stable, peaceful, and prosperous 
Afghanistan; (2) a friendly government in Afghanistan; (3) Indian influence in 
Afghanistan that is limited to the economy and development; and (4) accessibility to 
energy corridors in the CARs. 
B. REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL MATRIX AND DIVERGENT 
STRATEGIES 
The global and regional environment of the Central, Southern, and South East 
Asian regions has transformed drastically after both the demise of Soviet Union and the 
events of 9/11. Broadly, geo-economics have taken precedence over geo-political or 
military objectives, especially after the independence of the Central Asian States upon the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Economically, this region has emerged far ahead of the 
Middle East in terms of potential oil and gas reserves, as well as agricultural capacity.79 
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Therefore, the new “Great Game” is to gain access to the wealth of the region through 
plans off Hindu Kush on ancient precedence. With the emergence of a new “Great 
Game,” Afghanistan became the linchpin.  
Yet another shift occurred after 9/11 and the subsequent Afghan invasion, 
merging the geo-economic matrix with the security-borne milieu. This latest 
transformation has posed new challenges and threats to the region’s developing countries. 
The game is not restricted to limited powers, as it has been in the past, but has instead 
become a free-for-all.80 Having been exposed to geo-economic factors vis-à-vis the geo-
political transformation, the interests of various regional and extra-regional players have 
come to the forefront. Any influence inside Afghanistan by the external players directly 
or indirectly implicates Pakistan’s economic and security concerns. The new Great Game 
consists of several regional and extra-regional powers with various geopolitical stakes, 
such as Russia, China, the United States, Iran, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. 
1. India versus Pakistan  
Heading toward the “Afghan end-game” with the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 
2016, predominant regional players—such as India, Iran, and Pakistan—are further 
shoring up for their interests in Afghanistan and the region through their proxies in order 
to gain trade, political, and economic advantages and to hold a better position at the 
negotiation table.81 Historical rivals India and Pakistan have both pursued their 
respective “geopolitical, defense, and economic interests” in Afghanistan to thwart the 
other’s advantage.82 India has been hard at work to build a trade link via Iran and 
Afghanistan. This link has many advantages for India: one, land access to Central Asia; 
two, to outflank Pakistan militarily and economically and prevent Pakistan from 
achieving strategic depth in a stable Afghanistan; and three, to support the establishment 
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of any government in Afghanistan that is anti-Pakistan.83 John Arquilla and Hy 
Rothstein’s view supplements this argument—they describe Pakistan as the only direct 
subject of the “Afghan end game” after Afghanistan itself; India’s involvement with the 
aforementioned intents and the future friendliness of Afghanistan will directly determine 
Pakistan’s ability to cultivate and secure its interests.84 In other words, Pakistan’s loss is 
India’s gain; this rivalry obscures the two country’s efforts—as well as any other 
countries’ efforts—”to place Afghanistan on a sustainable path toward political stability, 
economic growth, and regional integration.”85 
a. India’s Increasing Influence in Afghanistan  
India has predominantly pursued such objectives in Afghanistan as (1) preventing 
anti-India terrorism; (2) undermining Pakistani and Taliban influence; (3) increasing 
access to Central Asia; and (4) projecting power and establishing global interests by 
adopting strategies, e.g., increasing development aid, supporting anti-Taliban factions 
(Northern Alliance), regionalizing solutions to the “Afghan end game” in terms of 
security and stability, and projecting power through military assistance.86 Generally, 
India’s main policy in Afghanistan, and beyond to the CARs, is driven by the country’s 
interest to counter Pakistan. India has thus “has worked hard to win the confidence of the 
post-Taliban government in Kabul.”87 India has spent more than $2 billion on 
development projects and other military assistance for the expansion of strong diplomatic 
and trade ties with Kabul.88 During this time, India has strongly endeavored to provide 
Afghanistan an alternate economic route that secures India’s economic interests while 
depleting any future economic gains for Pakistan.  
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For example, India spent approximately $135 million by 2009 to construct a 135-
mile highway, Delaram-Zaranj/Route 606, linking Iran’s border to the Kandahar–Herat 
Highway.89 Most recently, India conceived an $85 million plan to develop Chabahar Port 
by converting berths into container terminals that could be leased for at least two berths 
for 10 years.90 India has exploited prevalent “international anti-terrorism sentiments” to 
its advantage. Pakistan, logically, does not oppose India’s developmental assistance in 
Afghanistan; however, any other endeavor for marginalizing Pakistan’s security interests 
might jeopardize Pakistan’s approach to the “Afghan end-game.” U.S. Sectary of Defense 
Chuck Hagel’s remarks, while delivering a speech at Oklahoma’s Cameron University in 
2011, augment the argument here: “India for some time has always used Afghanistan as a 
second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of 
the border.”91  
Once Hamid Karzai gained power, India’s involvement in Afghanistan increased. 
Opening consulates under the “development” umbrella—specifically in boarder regions 
such as Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat—was a step in the same 
direction. After returning from a regional trip, U.S. Special Envoy James Dobbins 
described apprehension: “Pakistan’s concerns over India’s presence in Afghanistan are 
exaggerated but not groundless.”92 Therefore, it may not be baseless to say that India is 
using tactics to exert pressure on Pakistan by making its western border unsafe—the goal, 
then, is to give Pakistan no other choice than to compromise on its principled stand on 
Kashmir. India played a similar coercive maneuver in the 1971 crises that resulted in the 
Indo–Pak war and separation of East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) from the West.93 
Recently, Pakistan has submitted a dossier of evidence to the UN secretary general 
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regarding India’s destructive involvement inside Pakistan through its Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW), a spy agency of India.94  
b. Pakistan’s Response  
To quell political, economic, and security-related anxieties, Pakistan has several 
objectives for its relationships with Afghanistan: blocking threatening interests from 
other states, such as India; preventing encirclement and maintaining strategic depth; 
averting Afghan claims in the Pashtunistan or Durand Line issue; and building economic 
relations with the CARs through Afghanistan.95 To achieve these objectives, Pakistan has 
pursued various strategies. For instance, Pakistan might have kept proxy tools alive to 
thwart India’s influence. Pakistan has also worked to make itself indispensable to the 
Afghan reconciliation process, offering development aid and trade, keeping check on 
Afghanistan’s regional integration, and securing the energy and economic corridor that 
connects Pakistan and the CARs through Afghanistan. Pakistan has also made itself a 
frontline United States ally, which pressures Washington to protect Pakistan’s interests in 
the region.96  
While many commentators agree that President Musharraf held a strong stance 
against Al-Qaeda, but the members of the Pakistani Security setup demonstrated some 
sympathy toward the Taliban, possibly due to previous affiliations as well as significant 
capital invested in helping the group prior to 9/11. They were concerned that if the pro-
Pakistan Taliban failed, as the Taliban did after the U.S. invasion, then the next ruling 
government in Afghanistan may take a pro-India stance, which could have serious 
negative repercussions for Pakistan. These concerns were realistic as Karzai’s 
government permitted India to construct a number of consulates in Afghanistan along the 
Pakistan border, and has shown signs of discomfort with Pakistan despite the fact that 
Pakistan is fully contributing support after the Bone process. Any such sign of the 
Afghan government’s favoritism toward India causes worries for Pakistan. Pakistan also 
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has future security concerns on the horizon. One of these concerns is a possible 
disproportionate percentage of non-Pashtuns/Tajiks/Northern Alliance affiliates 
dominating the ANSF officers’ cadre, especially with respect to those trained in India 
who may carry anti-Pakistan sentiments. For this reason, Pakistan’s security setup tends 
to support Pashtun factions in Afghanistan to avoid losing ground in an unfavorable post-
2016 scenario; this would make sure Pakistan is still able to harvest a pro-Pakistan 
regime, or otherwise the Taliban could unshackle the Pashtunistan issue or likely to 
support Pakistani Taliban, who are anti-Pakistan.  
2. Russo–Indo–Iran Nexus 
Simultaneously, other regional players have their own issues to consider. Russia 
desires influence in Afghanistan in order to keep itself a regional power, to lure Iran into 
providing sustained supplies to the Northern Alliance, and to retain economic hold over 
the CARs.97 India is also a part of this nexus; however, India’s current focus is to 
enhance strategic ties with the United States, to, in turn, strengthen its greater ambitions 
against China—much like Pakistan’s recent efforts to strengthen ties with Russia.98 Since 
Iran has always supported the United States’ effort to contain the Taliban (also supported 
by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), Iran extended all-out support to the Northern Alliance to 
oppose the Taliban, while also aiming to bring together the Shiites in Afghanistan. 
However, the capture of two Iranian aircraft—loaded with arms, ammunition, and 35 
trucks along with their Iranian drivers from Mazar-e-Sharif—on August 8, 1998 
sufficiently exposed Iranian military involvement in Northern Afghanistan.99 
The Soviet Union’s disintegration at the end of the Cold War and the emergence 
of the CARs—rich in mineral resources—rekindled the West’s interests in this region. 
Russia, India, and Iran then realized that the economic linkage of the peaceful CARs with 
the United States/the West through Afghanistan and Pakistan would be a serious threat to 
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their economic interests in the region, and could leave them vulnerable to Islamic 
influence. The Russo–Indo–Iran nexus was thus established to keep Afghanistan 
unbalanced. All three countries supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan 
financially and militarily in order to create imbalance in the stability equation among 
Pakistan and the regional or extra-regional players.100  
Iran’s active influence remained significant in Afghanistan. The Iranian 
Republican Guard provided the first resistance to the Soviet invasion when they crossed 
the border into Afghanistan to support the anti-communist Mujahedeen. Their goal was to 
improve stability on Afghanistan’s borders while reducing the influence of Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan. “Iran’s Afghanistan policy is largely motivated by sectarian ties to 
Afghanistan’s Shia minority.”101 General McChrystal also endorsed the continued 
Iranian involvement as a way “to keep the pot boiling”; in his 2009 report, he explains, 
“Iran plays an ambiguous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance and 
political support to GIRoA while the Iranian Quds Force is reportedly training fighters 
for certain Taliban groups and providing other forms of military assistance to 
insurgents.”102 
3. Russia, China, and Pakistan as an Emergent Block 
China and Russia both possess the capacity to ally against any other set of powers 
in the future; however, Pakistan has yet to fully stabilize or secure its interests in the 
region—if India attains a strategic alliance with the United States against China, it would 
of course be to Pakistan’s disadvantage. For the United States, the U.S.–Pakistan versus 
U.S.–India allegiance poses a difficult conundrum. Pakistan may find a strategic gap to 
secure an alliance with Russia and further strengthen ties with China. Pakistan’s most 
recent endeavors to enhance ties with Russia induced possibly the first-ever visit of 
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Russian navy ships to Pakistani ports. This only happened after the U.S. president’s visit 
to India in 2014, and the signing of strategic agreements including a civil nuclear deal, 
which poured salt into Pakistan’s old wounds of “been left alone.” These frustrations 
have compelled Pakistan to realign itself in the international game of geopolitics to 
secure its survival.  
4. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
The role of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan together also remained crucial in 
Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia mainly helped the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the 
Soviets by providing them financial and arms support. Pakistan was the conduit used by 
both Saudi Arabia and the United States to fight an unconventional war in Afghanistan. 
Both countries pursued their respective agendas in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, being a 
Sunni kingdom, primarily facilitated the Taliban for its ability to counter the sway of a 
Shia Iran. Pakistan, however, had more geo-strategic interests. For having strong cultural, 
religious, and historical ties with the Afghan people, Pakistan inherently influenced 
Afghan developments and desired a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan to check 
India and Iran’s influence in the region: “Islamabad’s perceived need for a stable western 
border, the acquisition of strategic depth against India, and the prospect of using 
Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asian markets sharpened its resolve to support the 
Taliban despite heavy political, diplomatic and economic costs.”103  
Saudi Arabia’s role is well explained in the words of Ahmed Rashid:  
The Saudis have never developed a clear foreign policy toward 
Afghanistan and Central Asia, an omission the United States and other 
Western nations find deeply frustrating. But because they depend on Saudi 
oil, arms contracts, and goodwill, the Western nations, and in particular 
the United States, have refused to exert real pressure on Saudi Arabia to 
change its policies.104  
The Taliban thus continued their association with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  
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5. Conflict between the United States, Russia, and China 
The bigger participants of the New Great Game—the United States, Russia, and 
China—developed conflict while using Afghanistan as a buffer state to fulfill their 
national objectives, described in further detail in this section.  
a. U.S./NATO Presence in the Region 
After achieving the 2001 invasion’s broad objectives, the prolonged presence of 
U.S. and NATO forces on Afghan soil put the United States at a disadvantage for 
pursuing its interests in the South Asian region—for example, to reach out to the energy-
enriched CARs and Caspian Basin, to keep check on a re-energized Russia, and to 
contain an emergent China.105 The region’s growing economies and the GWOT’s fight to 
stop the spread of religious fundamentalism have enhanced the region’s significance. The 
United States has therefore become deeply involved in the region on diplomatic, 
economic, and military fronts. The objective of the 2001 U.S. intervention to overthrow 
the Taliban—the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom—was twofold: First, “to punish 
the perpetrators of 9/11 and the government that provided them with sanctuary;” second, 
“to create a moderate government in Afghanistan” that could contain the spillover of 
terrorism and secure access to the CARs’ energy resources. It is also perceived that 
before start of the Taliban regime in 1996, the “U.S. was backing a plan for gas and oil 
pipelines from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan towards markets in Pakistan, and 
beyond.”106 When Kabul fell to the Taliban, Unocal—the favored U.S. bidder for the 
pipeline—said that “it would make the pipeline project easier to implement”; however, 
because the Taliban did not have the control over northern Afghanistan until then, the 
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talks between Unocal and the Taliban never materialized.107 Hence, “the agenda of 
securing access to the energy resources of CARs was already in the cards, though not 
publicly declared.”108  
The United States is presently the on-scene commander in South Asian region, 
but the complexity of regional issues and divergent interests of regional and extra 
regional players is making it difficult for the United States to get the regional powers to 
orchestrate peaceful resolutions toward its end goals. At the same time, Russia and China, 
being the major state actors in the region, are adversely affected as well. 
b. Russia’s Interests  
Ever-changing global and regional settings have compelled Russia to reshape its 
regional policies, especially in the context of Afghanistan. Russia’s interests in the region 
in general, and in Afghanistan in particular, are (1) to maintain its status as a regional 
power; (2) to maintain its hold over the CARs and to prevent detrimental nationalist 
movements in these states; (3) to keep conditions unstable in Afghanistan—a stable 
Afghanistan would prevent the CARs from making a trade and energy link to the Arabian 
Sea, which would benefit the West—and to work with Iran to oversee the westward flow 
of hydrocarbon resources through the Caspian Sea and Central Asia; and (4) to retain 
influence in Afghanistan by supporting anti-Taliban factions—Northern Alliance leaders, 
mostly Tajiks and Uzbeks, that could help improve Russia’s image among the CARs as a 
compassionate power and also to protect the CARs from religious extremism flowing 
from Afghanistan.109 
c. China’s Interests  
Although China shares only a small mountainous border with Afghanistan—the 
Wakhan Corridor, which is virtually impassable and barely inhabited—but it has 
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increased its involvement in South Asian region primarily for Afghan minerals and other 
resources, and to avoid “encirclement” by India.110 The large U.S./NATO military 
presence right at its doorstep poses additional security concerns to China. During the past 
few years, China has significantly invested in Afghan reconstruction and infrastructure 
development for mineral extraction; this has also served to nurture a China-friendly 
Afghan population and improve relations with the Afghan government. The effects of 
religious fundamentalism, which spread from Afghanistan to the Muslim-dominated 
southwest Xinxiang province, is also viewed as “a threat to China’s stability;” it was at 
one point believed that China’s Muslim population was trying to mount an insurgency, 
and received training from Taliban sanctuaries in Afghanistan.111 To assuage economic 
and security concerns in the region, China has invested in Pakistan over the decades in 
the shape of mega-projects, e.g., the Gwadar deep sea port, coastal highway, and the 
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to gain quick access to warm waters and to 
keep Pakistan as a supporting stability force in China’s Xinxiang province. China’s 
economically “peaceful rise” and the progressive efficacy of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), which can collaborate with other countries to form an alliance in 
parallel to NATO, increases concerns for the United States in the region.112  
6. Pakistan among All Players 
Pakistan’s 2001 policy decision to ally with global and U.S. powers gradually 
directed the war onto Pakistani soil. The United States kept the pressure on Pakistan to 
“do more” against Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders hiding in Pakistan.113 Pakistan’s 
policy decisions and their implications (such as the Lal Masjid incident and military 
operations in FATA) caused anti-U.S. sentiments among the public. Radical 
sympathizers, powered by religiously exploited radical groups, formed Tehrik-e-Taliban 
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Pakistan (TTP). With the TTP working against the Pakistani military and its innocent 
people, Pakistan’s prime focus turned to internal law and order; Pakistan became 
increasingly concerned about its future security, especially with respect to the 
Pashtunistan or Durand Line issue, which could leave them open to foreign exploitation 
after 2016.  
Throughout the decade-long GWOT, Pakistan pursued policy against terrorism at 
a very high cost. Pakistan has sustained losses and causalities during the “other’s war,” 
far exceeding what any other country has suffered. According to South Asia Terrorism 
Portal’s most recent data sheet, Pakistan suffered 59,925 terrorism-related fatalities 
between 2003 and 2016; this figure includes 20,933 civilian and 6,412 security forces 
personnel casualties, while 32,580 terrorists/insurgents have also been eliminated.114 
Since 2013, over 9,500 terror-related incidents have taken place in Pakistan, destroying 
more than 700 schools in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, thus depriving at least 
100,000 children of education and bearing roughly $68 billion (U.S.) in overall costs of 
war.115 Despite these losses, Pakistan is still determined to peruse its policy against the 
radicals; however, “doing more” to align with U.S. and Western allies could further 
elevate its domestic issues and harm its future interests in Afghanistan. 
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III. FACTORS/VARIABLES, THREATS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR POST-U.S. WITHDRAWAL SCENARIOS 
Together, various stagnant factors have crafted the Afghan imbroglio throughout 
the GWOT. Dynamic (or kinetic) factors, however, have equal implications for the post-
U.S. withdrawal scenario in Afghanistan. These factors and variables will ultimately set 
the stage for the “transformation decade” after 2016. 
A. CONSTANT DYNAMICS/INHERENT FACTORS  
The factors and variables discussed in this section are ever-present in 
Afghanistan’s demography. They have shaped Afghan history to this point, and will 
continue to shape its future.  
1. Geostrategic and Geopolitical Connotations 
Afghanistan’s geostrategic position impacts world powers’ interests in the region, 
and consequently their geopolitical strategies. Its proximity to the CARs—rich with 
resources—to Iran—having enmity toward the West—to China—an emergent economic 
power—and to Pakistan—the only Muslim country with nuclear power—makes 
Afghanistan a conducive jump-off base for asserting influence in the region. These 
inherent geographic qualities will cause similar consequences in the future, and will 
continue to keep Afghanistan a place of conflict as world powers police the region. Had 
Afghanistan been located where, say, the Maldives are, it might have been a most 
peaceful country. 
2. Socio-political Factors  
Afghanistan’s social demography may prevent the country from ever 
transforming into a sophisticated political entity. The country’s varied ethnicities, 
coupled with the overall geopolitical environment, have prevented it from attaining even 
the semblance of a modern state. The overwhelming conflicts in Afghanistan have 
considerably altered the balance of social and political forces in its society, and have 
prevented the country from resolving traditional divisions. Afghanistan’s socio-political 
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environment is complex and unique—it cannot be compared to any other models that 
may otherwise help inform an optimal strategic solution. The complex traits of Afghan 
society discussed in this section have affected—and will continue to affect—
Afghanistan’s historic formulation and confound policymakers.  
a. Diversity and Psycho-social Context 
Afghanistan’s demographic heterogeneity has resulted in cultural, ethnic, 
linguistic, and political diversity. As a result, the Afghan people are more faithful to their 
individual groups and have less Afghan nationalism, making them prone to inter-group 
rivalries and avoidance of state authority. “Linguistic diversity” also elevates feelings of 
“individualism and separatism” among the people.116 In the recent past, yet another 
dimension of diversity has been introduced—ideological diversity among the 
fundamentalist Taliban, moderate Muslims, and communism-influenced population of the 
northern zones.117  
b. Pashtunwali  
The interplay of geographic, historic, and sociological peculiarities of Afghan 
society has resulted in a unique Afghan psychological profile. Afghanistan is a traditional 
tribal society in which all norms, values, and traditions fall within a comprehensive 
system of values called Pashtunwali, i.e., the code of conduct practiced primarily by the 
dominant Pashtun tribes.118 Pashtunwali plays a prominent role in conflict management 
through philosophies like nang (honor), Badal (revenge), Melmastia (hospitality), and 
Nanawatai (refuge).119 In addition to these Pashtunwali essentials, the Pashtuns believe 
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that they only fight for three things to maintain their honor: zar (gold), zan (women), and 
zamin (land).120  
The Taliban regime did not give up Osama Bin Laden to the United States in 
2001 due to the code of hospitality, which forbids Afghans from “handing over their 
guests to their enemies, even if it means sacrificing their own lives.”121 Pashtunwali—
symbolizing their personal bravery, honor, and revenge—remains integral in their fight 
against any adversary. The tradition of uniting around ethnic, religious, and tribal leaders 
against a common enemy helps them sustain any long-drawn struggle. As Johnson and 
Mason explains: “Pashtuns believe that their social code produces men, who are superior 
to those produced under the Western model, and they have no desire to have a new social 
system imposed on them by outsiders”; one could believe that nobody other than the 
Afghans themselves can devise a sustaining governing mechanism.122  
c. A Fiercely Independent Nature 
In the complex federation of Afghan people, clans, or tribes, opposing outsiders 
have always been challenging for the rulers.123 Sir John Lawrence, viceroy of India 
(1864–69) said, “The Afghans will put up with poverty and even insecurity of life but 
will never tolerate being ruled by foreigners.”124 Afghans resist accepting centralized 
control or a central figure as their leader. As Johnson explains, their loyalties always start 
with individuals, followed by family, extended family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, and last 
of all, the nation.125  
Social control is exercised very strictly in regard to strong religious beliefs and 
social relations established by kinship. The men control the women, the seniors control 
the juniors, and this forms the basis of the Afghan family. The families are extended into 
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Qawm/Tribe, and so a system or network is established. This network is usually headed 
by a Khan. The bond of tribe, family, and faction is always followed more strongly than 
the bond of nation. This hierarchy of loyalties—which is less understood by the outside 
world—prevents Afghanistan from integrating into a nation state with a central authority. 
d. A Tribal Nature  
Historically complex Afghan ethnicity, coupled with other factors such as 
tribalism and a distinct Jirga system, broadly dictates the efficacy of governance over the 
Afghan people.126 The country’s tribal nature incurs an ancient cultural process, which 
makes the Afghans antagonistic to external meddling—another sign that solutions must 
come from the Afghans themselves.  
In the complex mixture of various ethnic and ideological groups, no single tribe or 
clan can enforce its own will over another. The Soviets thus failed to centralize 
Afghanistan, despite their great military might. The non-Pashtun minorities similarly 
battled Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s efforts. Each ethnic or tribal entity—whether in majority 
or minority—possesses the capacity to collectively derail stabilization or democratization 
efforts in a post-2016 situation.127 
e. Ethnic Rivalries 
Afghanistan’s diverse society—with various ethnic groups all with multicultural 
differences—results in a nation rife with sub-groups that must protect their respective 
independence. Even Kabul cannot subject the groups, such as Pashtuns, to state authority 
due to their local customs and traditions.128 This makes the country vulnerable and 
prevents it from becoming a strong politico-military entity. Barfield compares the Afghan 
social setup to an “egalitarian lineage system”—“me against my brother, me and my 
brother against cousins, and all three of us against the world.”129  
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f. Warfare Skills 
Historically, Afghanistan has used “mobility” as its defense. Because lands empty 
of resources must traverse difficult terrain, Afghanistan does not need to worry about 
invaders; Afghans also are masters in techniques like the ambush, suited for their 
terrain.130 Alexander the Great faced these problems in the 4th century B.C. while 
fighting with mountainous tribes in Kunar Valley, similar to what coalition forces are 
facing now; in Alexander the Great’s time, however, the Afghans used boulders and 
stones to defend themselves, and now they use rockets.131  
Afghanistan’s best warfare asset, which has earned the country the title 
“graveyard of empires,” is its endurance to sustain conflicts; as the saying goes, “You 
have time, we have watches.” Afghan society’s aptitude for rebellion could lead to an 
unwanted outcome in a post-2016 scenario.  
g. The Pashtun Domination and Power Base 
At about 42 percent, Pashtuns are generally seen as the ruling elites and have 
dominated over the other races in Afghanistan since the 18th century.132 The power-base 
has remained within Pashtuns and within Pashtun ethnic groups in Durranis. Though the 
majority of the Taliban comprises Pashtuns, the group has actually defamed Pashtuns 
after experiencing their ruthless autocratic rule between the 1990s and the U.S. invasion 
in 2001. Despite their power hegemony, it might be difficult to overlook the Pashtuns 
coercive abilities if not involved or subjugated in a post-2016 scenario.  
B. DYNAMIC VARIABLES / FACTORS 
Kinetic factors may play to our advantage as we seek a desired result at the end of 
the post-2016 transformation decade in Afghanistan. 
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1. Internal Underlying Factors 
The following fundamental factors are a few internal baselines of Afghanistan, 
which might directly affect the outcomes one way or the other in post withdrawal period 
including institutional, social, economic, security, etc.  
a. Weak Institutions, Poverty, and Weak Education System 
Over three continuous decades of war, Afghanistan has become known globally 
as underdeveloped, poor, corrupt, radicalized, and an institutionally weak state. In the 
2015 United Nation Human Development Index,133 Afghanistan stands in one of the 
lowest categories, at 171 out of 188 countries, though this has improved since 1990.134 
Despite having received billions of dollars in aid during the last decade or so, 
Afghanistan is still unable to develop; 36 percent of its population still lives below the 
poverty line.135  
Poverty in Afghanistan is a serious problem; most citizens have not benefited 
from aid contributions and still suffer financially. When a foreign projects company in 
Afghanistan increased its pay from $5 to $6 a day, for instance, many teachers quit their 
jobs at schools to join the labor force.136 This shows two things: first, people are so poor 
that they are willing to abandon their professions, and second, economic policies have 
been badly managed by world powers, resulting in further institutional instability. 
Moreover, the absence of basic facilities—like electricity, housing, healthcare, 
transportation, and quality schools—makes institutional reform difficult, even with the 
help of foreign activists. Because Afghanistan is such a poorly developed nation, a 
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significant amount of effort, time, and long-term commitment will be needed to build it 
into a country capable of self-sustainment. 
b. Complex Governance/Political Stability 
Bad governance also plays a vital role in Afghanistan’s instability. Because the 
country is split into tribal regions with each having its own “cultures, norms, and systems 
of governance,” thus making extremely difficult for the government to exercise its 
centralized control. In order to “rule the complex confederation of tribes and avoid any 
confrontation,” Ibn Khaldun suggests a government must be able to “command obedience 
(even if by using force), collect taxes, administer justice, and handle all external political 
relations.”137 It was expected that Karzai, being a Pashtun, would be able to exercise 
control over the Pashtun tribes. However, his power remained partial; many often 
referred to him mockingly as the “mayor of Kabul” because his real influence seemed 
restricted to the capital. 
Part of the problem owes to the lingering view of the Taliban. What strikes many 
outside observers as harsh penalties resonated among locals as swift justice—in stark 
contrast to the general lawlessness that had prevailed before. “Brutal, conservative and 
repressive the Taliban may have been, but the West ignored their significant popularity in 
parts of Afghanistan” in terms of their governance over a complex tribal society.138  
Traditionally, Afghans do not trust each other when it comes to sharing power.139 
Their political loyalties focus more on a family-oriented socio-economic structure than 
on any national theme. In addition, the Afghan government seems lacking in political will 
to enforce law and order in the country or defeat the Taliban forcefully.140 In the coming 
decade, the validity of the Afghan government throughout the country should remain a 
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concern; in its current void of legal authority, there are many areas in Afghanistan under 
Taliban rule. In order to deal with the current state of insurgency, the government must 
be able to implement state laws, effective local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), and 
a speedy judicial system. 
Deep-rooted corruption is also a significant problem that is eroding the legitimacy 
of the Afghan government. The low salaries given to government officials aggravate the 
tendency toward corruption; the fact is that ex-President Karzai himself had been accused 
of engaging in and sanctioning corruption during his tenure. A report by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) claims that “in 2009, Afghan citizens had 
to pay approximately US$ 2.5 billion in bribes, which is equivalent to 23 per cent of the 
country’s [gross domestic product (GDP)].”141 The head of the UNODC claims that 
“corruption is the biggest impediment to improving security, development and 
governance in Afghanistan. It is also enabling other forms of crime, like drug trafficking 
and terrorism.”142  
Corruption in Afghanistan is formed by several factors: 
• low public-sector salaries 
• discretionary power of public administration 
• weak legal, legislative, and regulatory frameworks 
• dysfunctional justice sector and insufficient law enforcement 
• the narco-economy 
• limited oversight of the central government over sub-national 
administration 
• an unprecedented amount of international assistance 
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• tribal and regional leaders out of the central government’s control143 
Above all, there is an absence of any viable accountability framework. To seek a stable 
and self-reliant Afghanistan in the future, corruption must decrease. Fighting corruption 
requires a formidable governance system, accountability and legal frameworks, and 
economic stability.144 The desired governance system may not happen in the near future, 
yet it ultimately demands long-term commitment and constructive efforts by all 
stakeholders in structuring the state and government to overcome the problem.  
c. Justice System 
A viable justice system is the backbone of any coherent society or state. 
Considering Afghanistan’s complex society, most Afghans adhere to the local Jirga 
system to resolve their issues, wherein justice is done through their customs instead of 
any constitution. Judicial institutions, if there were any, have further weakened during the 
last decade of war, during which warlordism has strengthened. The lack of a justice 
system has greatly played in destabilizing Afghanistan as a state. The courts that 
currently exist are unviable, and the few that are operational are shorthanded. The Afghan 
people, thus, have lost assurance in the formal justice system, a situation that seems to 
give impunity to cheats, criminals, and corruption. In order to enforce the government’s 
authority, maintain law and order, and bring the Afghan people under a centralized 
national umbrella, judicial reforms are mandatory. Future perspectives in Afghanistan 
depend on a workable judicial system that enforces a centralized government framework.  
d. Opium Growth and Drug Business  
Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has affected the country, its neighbours, and the 
rest of the drug-seeking world. Before 2001, the Taliban themselves somewhat repressed 
opium production; but contrarily, the current Taliban insurgency, however, “relies on 
opium revenues to purchase weapons, train its members, and buy support,” as they are 
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not left with any other method or foreign support for generating the revenue.145 In 2001, 
Afghanistan produced only 11 percent of the world’s opium; today it produces around 93 
percent of the global crop, and the drug trade accounts for a fair amount of Afghanistan’s 
GDP.146 This increase happened solely because there are no other options for revenue 
generation in Afghanistan both for public sector or even the insurgents. Due to 
nonexistence of adequate alternatives for earning, the most of Afghan farmers resorted to 
poppy cultivation, and thus the problem got worse. Institutional weakness has not 
considerably improved over the last decade. Because the root causes of institutional 
weakness were never identified when the conflict began, it is now worse than ever. 
Without strong economic reform including opening of new avenues for revenue 
generation, and proper legislation to curb the opium growth, this issue will only get worse 
after the 2016 withdrawal.  
e. Dependency on International Donors for Economic Revival/Stability 
According to the World Bank, “Afghanistan’s biggest economic challenge is 
finding sustainable sources of growth,” implying that the country will remain vulnerable 
if in an unstable government persists.147 The World Bank further assesses that 80 
percent–90 percent of Afghan economic activities are illegal, mostly as a result of opium 
production. Rest of economic activity is generated through international military and 
developmental aid and spending in the country by foreign troops, which was roughly 
$15.7 billion through 2010.148 The United States has so far endured the most of war 
costs, contributing approximately $3.7 trillion, including financial aid for the running of 
the Afghan government and military.149 In a 2012 Chicago conference, NATO countries 
guaranteed the Afghan military $4.1 billion in aid after withdrawal; in the same year in 
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Tokyo, donors led by the United States, Japan, Germany, and the UK committed $16 
billion to civilian sectors in Afghanistan.150  
Afghanistan’s current economy is donor-driven, with large economic deficit being 
balanced through huge aid influx from bilateral and multilateral donors.151 The Afghan 
government will need roughly $4 billion for its security after 2016.152 In order to sustain 
the ANSF, the country will largely be dependent on external financial support; if foreign 
aid is not available, Afghanistan will eventually have to reduce the strength of its 
forces.153 When financial assistance stops or is even reduced, there will be further 
economic repercussions, especially in the absence of trade and industry. The Afghan 
regime, in the long-term, will need to exploit its rare earth minerals reserves—or 
possibility of getting benefits from un-taping of CARs rich oil reserves once trading 
through its territory—but in the short-term it must economically empower its local 
communities and industries in order to address the concern to some extent.154  
f. The Taliban Factor 
The Taliban has played a significant role in Afghan affairs over last two decades, 
and will be the deciding element in the outlook for a stable Afghanistan post-2016. The 
Taliban is as steadfast as ever, and retain its “cohesive force.” Despite withstanding the 
long war on terror, it again has stretched its influence in the majority of provinces all over 
the country. World powers have realized that there is no military solution to a “war of 
ideas,” and so have resorted to seeking a political solution as an exit strategy. However, 
history shows that the Taliban will continue to reemerge after this type of conflict. 
Table 1 explores the factors that led to the Taliban’s emergence after the Soviet 
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withdrawal, how those same factors have affected the current state of affairs, and how 
they are likely to affect the post-2016 withdrawal era. 
Table 1.   Possibilities of Taliban Reemergence 
Key Enablers Factors Leading to the 




of Affairs (Prior to U.S. 
Withdrawal) 




Young graduates of 
madrassas, disenchanted 
from Mujahedeen in the 
‘90s, formed “Taliban,” an 
Arabic term that refers to 
students of the Islamic faith 
who suddenly rise and 
became volatiles. They 
gradually developed a 
rogue/extremist 
interpretation of Islam.155 
The Taliban re-emerged in 
Afghanistan by declaring 
Jihad against invading 
forces. Their selling 
substance is still to impose 
an orthodox version of 
Islamic law in Afghanistan, 
to spread hatred for the 
United States, and to create 
fear through terrorism. 
Although the Taliban would 
lose their standpoint of 
Jihad after U.S. withdrawal; 
however, they would likely 
to continue with their 
political cum religious 
hegemonic designs owing to 
the strength they have 
gained so far, in case if 
political instability and 
fragile security situation in 




Afghanistan became an 
orphaned issue for the world 
after the defeat of 
communism. The United 
States, which helped 
Pakistan through Saudi 
Arabia fight religious 
narrative against the 
Soviets, were left alone. No 
social or structural 
development was offered to 
the Afghans, who then 
welcomed militancy 
replacing militancy.156 
In 2003, the United States 
shifted its focus with 
beginning of its military 
intervention in Iraq.157 
However, decline in 
American interest in the 
region is less likely at the 
moment. 
 
The United States might 
continue helping the Afghan 
government for several 
years after its withdrawal 
due to its objectives in the 
region; however, the 
situation otherwise may 
prove fragile due to various 
stagnant and dynamic 
factors mentioned in this 
chapter. Ultimately, it is 
better sooner than later for 
the Afghans themselves 
who have to shoulder the 
responsibility sooner than 





All the neighboring 
countries supported warring 
factions that represented 
their respective ideologies 
over last two decades. The 
The Taliban resurged due to 
the poor conduct of 
invading forces in 
Afghanistan after the initial 
victory. All neighboring 
Conflicting interests inside 
Afghanistan of neighboring, 
regional and extra regional 
countries are likely to 
continue as discussed in 
                                                 
155 Kamal Matinuddin , The Taliban Phenomenon, Afghanistan 1994–1997, (Oxford University Press: 
Feb, 11, 1999), 25–26. 
156 Ibid., 37–38. 
157 Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War: 2001–2014,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Last Updated: October 14, 
2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War. 
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United States, Pakistan, and 
Saudi Arabia were in favor 
of the Taliban; however, 
other countries became 
opposed to them.158 
 
countries, as well as the 
regional and extra-regional 
countries, continued playing 
their opposing strategies in 
the weak politico-military 
situation, and thus the 
Taliban reemerged. 
chapter II. For Russia, it 
would like an unstable 
Afghanistan through the 
Taliban or any other faction 
so as it keep avoiding other 
powers to metalize energy 
corridor through 
Afghanistan to CARs but 
not allowing repercussions 
inside Russia’s sphere. For 
India, it would like to keep 
using Afghanistan against 
Pakistan at all costs, either 
by installing anti Pakistan 
govt. of non-Pashtuns in 
Afghanistan or by trying to 
materialize Energy Corridor 
dream to its interest through 
Iran. Contrarily, for 
Pakistan only a stable and 
prosperous Afghan state 
suits the most owing to its 
security and economic 
compulsions; besides, it 
would also wish to have a 
friendly govt. possibly of 
Pashtuns(not the Taliban) in 
Afghanistan or at least a 
government not serving 
only the India’s interest in 
the region or let using its 
soil against Pakistan. For 
China, it would also likely 
to favor for a peaceful 
Afghanistan-good for its 
bordering region with more 
economic avenues. Iran and 
Saudi Arabia would likely 
to peruse their respective 
religious motives. Similarly, 
other regional and world 
powers would peruse their 
own interests. Ultimately, 
the Taliban again in the 
power would not be the 
wish, option or a solution 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
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Out of a culture of crime 
and violence, as well as 
unemployment, the Taliban 
emerged—they were 
volatile, desperate with an 
Islamic fundamentalist 
agenda, and sought a violent 
solution to Afghanistan’s 
problems. 
Increased armed struggle is 
dependent on failure to 
establish a viable political 
setup with equal ethnic 
representation. The United 





The current power-sharing 
formula in the Afghan 
government is proving to be 
productive. However, 
considering the Afghans’ 
psychosocial profile with 
their unique tribal nature, 
and where the Pashtun 
dominate the power base, 
coupled with their long 
ethnic rivalries and fiercely 
independent nature, this 







Post-Soviet turmoil and the 
subsequent political vacuum 
led Afghan people to 
embrace any change, by any 
means. After the fall of 
Najibullah’s government, 
the Afghan  contenders 
mutually agreed on a power 
sharing formula with the 
“Peshawar Accord.” But 
nothing succeeded, and no 
single figure appeared 
capable of bringing order to 
Afghanistan. Thus, by 1993, 
Afghanistan was virtually at 
the verge of disintegration 
where national stakes were 
overwhelmed by egos and 
vested interests. The 
situation was therefore ripe 
for emergence of any force 
that could hold the strings 
together.159 
The Taliban, despite all 
pitfalls associated with their 
name, became quickly 
known among locals for 
swift justice. Loyn 
comments: “Brutal, 
conservative and repressive 
the Taliban may have been, 
but the West ignored their 
significant popularity in 
parts of Afghanistan.”160 
After their defeat, they 
might have been resolved 
through peace talks and 
addressing their political 
concerns.161 
 
For the Afghan people, the 
future likely looks 
comparable to what 
happened after the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989; 
however, this time the 
Afghans, themselves need 
to reject any violent faction 
through political 
consolidation, otherwise 
any other foreign country 




“The Taliban movement 
started as a politico-
religious force, to the 
oppression of the local 
U.S. forces’ deployment 
remained restricted to urban 
areas. Moreover, 
The United States supported 
Internal law and order never 
improved, especially in 
areas outside urban cities. 
Efficacy of the ANSF 
                                                 
159 Ibid., 39–41.  
160 David Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, 271. 
161 Ibid., 272. 
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governor. They forced the 
surrender of dozens of local 
Pashtun leaders.”162 Acts 
of brutality and denial of 
basic human rights were not 
challenged by most Afghans 
owing to lack of education 
and political awareness, and 
above all non-existence of 
an alternative.163 
certain unpopular warlords 
and failed to disarm other 
warlords and tribal chiefs, 
which barred the 
establishment of a cohesive 
national army. Atrocities 
were carried out by the 
Northern Alliance, 
strengthening the Taliban’s 
narrative.  
coupled with a viable justice 
system and stable central 
government, would reduce 
the state of anarchy, thus 
facilitating involuntary 
rejection of any fierce 





entangled in ethnic divide 
and resulting clashes for 
centuries. In post-Soviet 
period, the Taliban emerged 
as the strongest Pashtun 
outfit and gained the 
support of the majority of 
Pashtuns.164 
In the early 2000s, the 
Pashtun cultural ethos was 
exploited by Al-Qaeda who 
was sure that they would 
not be handed over to an 
external force.165  Ethnic 
orientation is another 
dimension strengthened by a 
particular fraction. 
In Afghan culture and 
ethnic-based society, sub-
nationalism would remain 




Billions of dollars received 
during the Afghan–Soviet 
war were spent by the 
warlords on building 
personal armies. The 
common Afghans lost faith 
in existing leadership and 
readily embraced the new 
force.166 
The same happened during 
the U.S.–Afghan war. 
Unable to kick-start a stable 
economy and reduce 
poverty, the Norco-
economy kept flourishing, 
which became a prime 
source of revenue for the 
Taliban to grow.167 
 
Presently, the Afghan 
economy is foreign-aid 
driven. The ANSF, its 
primary means for stability 
after U.S. withdrawal, 
depends on risky foreign 
funding. If foreign aid stops 
or is unable to achieve 
economic reforms, the 
ANSF would itself become 
vulnerable and the Taliban 




The Taliban used the 
concept of “Shura,” which 
resembles the centuries-old 
Jirga system, and 
After U.S. occupation, a 
non-population centric 
approach was adopted.168 
In the undereducated 
Afghan society, any 
approach that is contrary to 
their customs and traditions 
                                                 
162 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon, 25–26. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., 39–41. 
165 David Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, 266. 
166 Noor ul Haq, “Afghanistan Future,” Pakistan Observer, October 5, 2012, 
http://www3.pakobserver.net/201210/06/detailnews.asp?id=176846.   
167 Norco-economy is indicative of economy that is primarily based on illegal means, in which 
revenues are mostly generated through trade of narcotics. This term is frequently used to refer 
Afghanistan’s economy that bases mostly on cultivation and trading of poppy.  
168 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames , 3–4.  
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governance with local 
traditions, which formed an 
attractive narrative for the 
Afghan people to accept. 
Despite billions of dollars in 
aid, U.S. COIN could not 
enforce a WHAM strategy, 
providing space for the 
Taliban to grow in strength 
as well as spatially. 
will be counterproductive, 
and will drive them to other 
models that behave closer to 
their customs and traditions.  
 
2. External Factors 
This section describes the kinetic factors of external influence. Afghanistan’s 
post-2016 “transformation decade” will depend upon how these variables play out.  
a. Long-term U.S. Objectives in South Asia 
U.S. global security interventions in Afghanistan—which lacked strategic or long-
term foresight—implicated the United States and various other regions.169 Despite 
Obama’s recent withdrawal plan, seeking to draw down U.S. forces to bare embassy level 
by 2016, there will still be a U.S. presence in the region for the foreseeable future.170 It is 
thus vital to account for the United States’ long-term goals in South Asia. “The long term 
objectives of U.S. are: the energy deposits, containment of China, encirclement of Iran or 
keeping an eye on Paki nukes. .… Considering all that, it seems as if the U.S. is thinking 
of keeping Afghanistan as a foothold and is looking for a long haul whereby it would 
maintain and increase its influence not only on Iran, Pakistan and China but also the 
CARs.”171 Because of long-term U.S. plans, Pakistan believes the United States is going 
to stay in the region for a considerable amount of time, and will ultimately continue to 
influence regional politics. As a strategic imperative, the United States must keep boots 
on the ground at some of its bases in Afghanistan after the 2016 transition. The United 
States desires to keep nine military bases in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, especially 
                                                 
169 Hew Strachan, “Making Strategy: Civil- Military Relations after Iraq,” Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, Volume 48, Issue 3, 2006, 59–70. 
170 Luis Ramirez, “Obama Announces Afghanistan Withdrawal Plan,” Voice of America, May 27, 
2014.  
171 Post Seminar Report, “Afghanistan End Game.”  
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in areas bordering Iran, China, and Pakistan—in Kabul, Bagram, Mazar, Jalalabad, 
Gardez, Kandahar, Helmand, Shindand, and Herat. This plan is an indication of the 
United States’ long-term objectives in the region.172  
b. Transition 
With the declaration of withdrawal in 2011, the U.S. administration has actually 
signaled an end to nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.173 The U.S. president stated, 
“We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place,” clearly indicating the United 
States’ intent in the recent timeframe.174  Consequently, U.S. strategy has seemed to have 
deviated, gradually but steadily, from its core methodology of COIN or counterterrorism 
and reinforcing the alternatives through effective governance and economic growth. 
However, the death of Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden provided the United States a 
reason to proclaim success, having isolated Al-Qaeda and broken the Taliban’s 
momentum. In the first quarter of 2013, ISAF forces were able to hand over around 22 
percent of their military facilities to the ANSF, which was forward momentum toward a 
complete transition by the end of 2016.175 It could now rightly be anticipated that the 
United States has broadly accomplished its mission and “the stage is set” for handing 
over the helm of affairs to Afghan establishment, during which Kabul would function as 
a nucleus for grand reconciliation among the Afghans. It is yet a challenging task; 
however, to achieve a smooth transition that satisfies the Afghans—in order to do so, 
there must be an established and legitimate Afghan government, political stability, taking 
control by the ANSF, solid institutions, economic revival, and regional stability.  
Some indicators demonstrating that the post-transition withdrawal is still 
uncertain include the following: 
                                                 
172 Matthew Rosenberg, “Karzai Says U.S. Bases Can Stay, Raising Some Eyebrows in West,” (New 
York Times, 2013).  
173 Mark Landler and Helene Cooperus, “Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan,” The 
New York Times, June 22, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23prexy.html?pagewanted=all.  
174 Ibid.  
175 Jim White, “‘Progress’ Report: ANSF Abandoning over One Third of ISAF Facilities,” Empty 
Wheel, August 1, 2013, http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/01/progress-report-ansf-abandoning-over-
one-third-of-isaf-facilities/.  
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• Shortfall in coalition training personnel. 
• Afghan government’s limited financial resources. 
• Lack of a “self-sustaining foundation for generating jobs and revenue that 
will reduce dependence on international assistance.”176 
• Lack of motivation—up to 30-percent deserters per annum in the 
ANSF.177 Other major reasons for desertions include stoppage of leave 
while being deployed in combat zones for months; heavy causalities in the 
recent past; the pay collection issues, etc.178  
• Afghan National Army’s (ANA) dependence on international 
assistance.179 
• Taliban capacity to re-emerge versus the ANSF’s capacity to amicably 
handle the mess. 
• Increased Indian intervention inside Afghanistan and covert operations 
inside Pakistan. 
• Economic sustainability by creating alternatives if foreign aid ceases and 
attracting foreign direct investments (FDI). 
c. Presence of U.S. Forces / Foreign Troops in Afghanistan 
Despite a huge debate over the zero option, President Obama has declared the 
gradual force drawdown after 2016. U.S. presence in Afghanistan is seen critically by all 
players.180 Because of the fragile internal security dynamics in Afghanistan, however, a 
continued U.S. presence post-2016 is preferred by most neighboring countries, and is in 
the Afghans’ best interest. On the other hand, the presence of foreign boots on 
                                                 
176 Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
Independent Task Force Report No. 65 (New York, Council on Foreign Relations: 2010), 
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177 Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, interview to The World Post, 
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178 Joseph Goldstein, “Afghan Security Forces Struggle Just to Maintain Stalemate,” The New York 
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Afghanistan soil (seen as invaders) will still fuel the Taliban’s religious legitimacy, 
having declared Jihad against them. After 2016, a number of allied troops will be a 
necessary stabilizing factor with respect to fragile security situation—especially 
considering the ANSF’s ability to take control of the entire country while fueling the 
Taliban’s cause. The continued presence will also help fuel the regrowth of Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or their further expansion to other countries aligned with ISIS. On the other 
hand, regional countries especially Iran, China, or Russia would still have security 
concerns over the U.S. policy of pre-emption for having an easy launching pad inside 
Afghanistan to pour in more troops if needed. 
d. The Pakistan Factor 
Pakistan remains pivotal in shaping the future course of stability in Afghanistan 
and the region. Pakistan’s grave security concerns regarding India’s increased role in 
Afghanistan and cross-border terrorism have caused the threat spectrum to increase; 
Pakistan’s entire western border, including tribal areas and the provinces of Baluchistan 
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is considered vulnerable. It is in Pakistan’s best interest to 
have a peaceful, friendly, and stable Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan would only be 
possible with a long-term, inclusive government in Kabul that gives a fair share of power 
to all factions of the society, avoiding biases toward Pakistan. This scenario also would 
lead to the return of millions of Afghan refugees currently residing in Pakistan, and 
would open economic opportunities within the CARs’ energy corridor. Other issues 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan—such as the Durand Line, Pashtunistan, drug 
trafficking, and illicit trade—may also be resolved in the presence of a strong and stable 
Afghan government. Pakistan, therefore, ought to enhance mutual strategic, security, and 
economic relations.  
On the other hand, external factors in their turn also may compel Pakistan to 
pursue a more defensive approach toward stability.181 Incidents like the Peshawar Army 
Public School incident—when innocent schoolchildren were killed brutally through a 
                                                 
181 Muhammad Emad, “Afghanistan – Post 2014,” The Citadel Journal, no. 2/13 (Pakistan, Quetta, 
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planned terrorist attack executed from inside Afghanistan by Mullah Fazlullah and other 
affiliates—raise questions about Afghanistan’s ability to cure its own problems before 
they can ask the same from Pakistan.  
e. UN Peace Keeping 
Although the UN has made efforts to play an active role in the political 
stabilization of Afghanistan, those efforts have been fruitless. Various efforts over the 
period of the international organization with the support of all major powers of the world 
include: 
• United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
• Employing UN Special envoys to Afghanistan 
• United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
• Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) 
Despite sincere intentions and best efforts, the UN has failed to make a mark on the 
Afghan political horizon. That is why Afghanistan’s political shape has remained mostly 
in the hands of the occupation forces, with UN being relegated to a subsidiary role. To be 
sure, all major powers—including the Soviets and the United States—have tried 
incursion methods of influence, whereas other regional countries—Pakistan, Iran, India, 
Saudi Arabia, etc.—have tried covert methods of influencing Afghanistan’s internal 
dynamics; it is likely that any other country’s effort in the region—with whatever 
method—will also fail. Looking toward the 2026 news scenarios introduced at the 
beginning of this thesis, UN forces might be needed if the fragile Afghanistan situation 
becomes too much for the ANSF to handle after U.S. withdrawal in 2016. 
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IV. POST-WITHDRAWAL SCENARIOS 
Brig (Retd) Said Nazir Mohmand notes, “Afghanistan is like a hot potato at this 
point in time. The international community cannot hold it, the regional players cannot 
swallow it and the inland ethnic groups cannot digest it singularly.”182 Had the collective 
endeavours for a smooth political transition enacted in 2014 been introduced earlier, the 
situation might have been totally different. U.S. President Barack Obama once rightly 
highlighted: “Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backward. There 
is no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained 
momentum. Al Qaeda has not re-emerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 
9/11, but they retain their safe-havens along the border.”183  
The possible post-U.S. withdrawal scenarios described in this chapter are based 
on the factors discussed in the previous chapters. Whichever scenario prevails, these 
factors will play a critical role in defining the future for Afghanistan and the region. The 
likely future scenarios are broadly categorized as The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly; 
each is built upon certain assumptions to address uncertainties and their consequent 
implications. 
A. THE GOOD  
Afghanistan, like any other nation, could emerge from the recent chaos as a 
prosperous country. But the best outcome demands rigorous commitment by all 
stakeholders, whether they are the Afghans themselves or neighboring countries, regional 
or global players.  
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1. Key Imperatives of the Good Scenario 
The Good scenario involves a whole-of-nation approach in which all Afghans 
cooperate. This cooperation would lead to institutional reforms that improve the 
educational and justice systems, bureaucracy, and the economy, and reduce poverty and 
mass corruption. This scenario also involves strengthening the ANSF, which must be 
capable of countering both internal and external threats. This scenario includes the 
baseline assumptions discussed in the following subsections. 
a. Political 
A bright future for the Afghan nation must involve political reconciliation among 
its various ethnicities, groups, or tribes. This reconciliation is the only means of 
diminishing the underlying inherent factors (discussed in previous chapters) that have 
hindered prosperity in the past. Political reconciliation includes: 
A Viable Power-Sharing Formula. Afghanistan needs a viable, all-encompassing 
power-sharing formula that caters to all factions, but particularly the majority faction, the 
Pashtuns. Although the present Afghan government somewhat represents the various 
groups, it still needs a long-term power-sharing plan that is proportionate to the 
respective groups’ populations. 
Integration of Dissident Factions. The Taliban and other factions that are 
currently treated as enemies have to be integrated in the polity of the country. Incentives 
may have to be offered to these groups in the form of economic benefits and/or 
representation in the government and political offices and the military. Lack of political 
integration may lead to a civil war. 
Non-Interference of Neighboring Countries. A politically stable country with a 
self-sustaining economy and a strong military must prevent outside countries from having 
unlimited involvement in domestic affairs. For Afghanistan to achieve this, it needs a 
strong national will and leadership. It also requires a viable diplomacy policy that allows 
the Afghan government to successfully engage neighboring countries—such as the 
CARs, Iran, Pakistan, India, and China—to its benefit. For instance, Afghanistan will 
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want to continue a constructive relationship with India, but must not allow India’s 
unlimited involvement in domestic affairs. 
b. Economic 
Foreign Direct Investment. Mineral/resource-rich Afghanistan has huge 
investment potential, estimated at $1 trillion.184 Creating an economic interest for all 
stakeholders can be a major stabilizing factor for the country.  
Sustainable Economy. Afghanistan needs almost $10 billion a year through 2025 
for both security and development.185 If the country institutes long-term, sustainable 
economic policies, however, Afghan dependency on foreign aid/resources will reduce 
after the drawdown of foreign forces. The agriculture sector “accounts for up to 40 
percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product,” and is “critical to Afghanistan’s food 
security and a driver of economic growth.”186 So in addition to foreign aid, it will remain 
important to promote the agricultural sector and economic and trade zones, which may 
help rid the country of its narco-economy.  
c. Security 
U.S. Drawdown in 2016 and Residual Forces. On one hand, the drawdown may 
reduce the Taliban’s power. On the other hand, it may put the ANSF at the Taliban’s 
mercy, paving the way for another civil war. With this in mind, it is in the best interest of 
both the United States and the Afghan government to ensure residual U.S. forces are in 
place for the foreseeable future. Residual forces will help control the Taliban and 
safeguard U.S. interests.  
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Capacity Building of the ANSF. To maintain peace and stability, a well-trained 
and equipped ANSF is crucial. However, this will require continuous foreign aid and 
equipment, and keeping ethnic/sectarian considerations as well as adopting a qualitative 
training regime for ANSF. A capable ANSF will also enhance the central government’s 
legitimacy and authority throughout the country and supply the means to deal with the 
Taliban amicably.  
2. Outlooks of the Good Scenario: A Secure and Stable Afghanistan 
This scenario is based on the assumption of a successfully negotiated long-term 
power-sharing formula. Core issues concerning security, peace, and economic and 
political reforms have not yet been addressed. Recognition of the Taliban’s inclusion in 
peace talks, however, indicates that a stable Afghanistan is a possible, though distant, 
scenario within the next decade.187  
a. Likely Environment 
• The United States, along with other coalition partners, would remain 
committed to providing military assistance (residual forces) and economic 
assistance for the ANSF and wider economic revival through 2025.  
• The United States/NATO/ISAF would keep their role limited to nation 
building/assistance.  
• Major policy changes would occur. A reconciliation policy would replace 
the current confrontation policy; political forces would put forth a major 
effort to use the military only to assist the political process. 
• Compound governance would validate political stability. Afghan groups 
may reconcile further with each other and support the coalition 
government. 
• The role of extremist elements would be considerably reduced and 
warlords would be absorbed into mainstream politics after having been 
disarmed.  
• The Taliban would remain uninvolved amid residual U.S. presence.  
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• The ANSF would emerge as a potent/capable force post-national 
consensus and declined insurgency.  
• With improvement in internal security, projects involving oil and mineral 
resources would be initiated, including oil and gas pipeline projects. 
• Economic revival would be accomplished through agricultural reforms 
and FDI, especially by China.  
• Afghanistan would emerge as an energy corridor for the resource-rich 
CARs and would accrue great economic benefits.  
• Fast-paced development and economic recovery would create an 
economic stake for all factions, thereby reducing militancy.  
• Bilateral relations based on non-interference between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan would improve. 
b. Uncertainties  
• Future U.S. objectives and strategy remain uncertain, and a point of 
contention among Afghans. 
• Regional consensus remains uncertain due to divergent political and 
economic interests. 
• Absolute peace remains uncertain due to Al-Qaeda and narcotics mafias.  
• It is uncertain if this scenario would serve the interests of India, Iran, and 
Russia more favorably than Pakistan.  
c. Implications for Pakistan 
The Good scenario would return peace and stability to the region; a harmonious 
culmination of Afghanistan end game would bring several benefits for Pakistan.  
• Pakistan would have relatively safe western borders, which would 
somewhat (though not completely) relieve the armed forces of their 
current strain under a two-front commitment. 
• Pakistan would able to eliminate Pakistan-based terrorists and local 
insurgents by improved security measures on Pakistan’s western borders 
with Afghanistan. 
• Both Afghanistan and Pakistan may reach an agreement to recognize the 
Durand Line as an international border, or to work under mutual standard 
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operation procedures (SOPs) at the border. This would also reduce cross-
border smuggling, terrorism, and similar concerns. 
• The role of extremist elements would be marginalized in both Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. This would contribute positively toward regional security 
and stability and provide the right environment for economic activity.  
• Pakistan would be able to engage in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
ISAF’s presence would be beneficial for Pakistan’s interests during this 
period.  
• A national government consensus between the Pashtun/Taliban is likely to 
reduce Indian influence over Kabul; however, Indian economic/military 
aid will help maintain friendly ties. 
• As a result of China’s presence in major Afghan investments, India’s 
influence would become limited. India may not be able, then, to influence 
Pakistan’s domestic affairs, as in conflicts such as the Baluchistan 
uprising. 
• Repatriation of some 1.6 million registered and 1.4 million unregistered 
Afghan refugees currently residing in Pakistan would reduce its economic 
burden.188  
• Pakistan could accomplish its long-desired geo-economic goals through 
establishing trade and energy corridor to CARs. In addition, the 
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline project 
could also prove helpful in addressing Pakistan’s energy catastrophe. 
• Pakistan is likely to benefit economically from the Afghan energy corridor 
and Afghan transit trade. 
d. Implications for the Region and the World 
• A negotiated, peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict would be the best 
outcome—a win-win scenario for all stakeholders. A stable environment 
will give a tremendous boost to economic activities and energy 
transportation in the region, leading to durable peace.  
  
                                                 
188 Azhar Khan, “Govt. to register 1.4 Million Afghan Refugees,” ARY News, (Islamabad: March 11, 
2015), https://arynews.tv/en/govt-register-1-4-million-afghan-refugees/. 
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• Vision of “New Silk Road,” creating trade and energy corridor from CARs 
to Middle East through Afghanistan, might float an opportunity for bigger 
strategic convergence in South Asia.189   
• Afghanistan can be integrated into the larger world and region more 
effectively as a useful member, which will diminish Al-Qaeda’s threat. 
3. Sustainable Democracy with Broad-based Government 
Progressive democracy190 is the most desirable state for the United States and its 
allies. A stable, progressive, and democratic Afghanistan with a unified government—
having requisite representation of all the factions and tribes, including the Taliban—is in 
the mutual interest of all stakeholders; however, in order to implement and mature, it will 
require relentless and open-minded policies in all spheres. The political setup could 
predicate a weak central government and strong local governments—the federal 
government would control law and order, economic policy, and foreign policy, delegating 
the remainder of power to local governments. Increased devolution of power further 
strengthens the confederacy.191 
a. Likely Environment 
• A maintainable governing body with the requisite amount of authority 
would be ensured before exit.  
• Afghanistan’s economy would require maintenance and support from 
modern and developed nations for at least 10 years.192  
                                                 
189 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “Pakistan’s ‘Regional Pivot’ and the Endgame in Afghanistan,” IPRI Journal XIII, 
No. 2, (NDU: Islamabad, summer 2013), 20, http://www.ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/OPINION-Vol.1-No.2-
Dec.pdf. 
190 “Progressive democracy means responding well to the needs of all people while working to 
preserve the values of life, freedom, security, justice, health, education, prosperity, a sustainable 
environment, and peace.” See Sanderson Beck, Progressive Democracy: How Wise Love Can Produce 
Prosperity, Justice and Peace, (Santa Barbara: World Peace Communications, July 2011), 
http://www.san.beck.org/ProgressiveDemocracy.html.  
191Asad Munir, “Post Exit-Afghanistan – Pak Scenarios;” Naveed Mukhtar (Lieutenant General 
Naveed Mukhtar is a Three Star rank Pakistan Army General and he is the current Commander of 5 Corps 
at Karachi), “Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and Their Implications,” Parameters, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
Summer 2011, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/mukhtar.pdf.  
192 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Afghan War in 2013.”   
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• The regional players would be satisfied with the arrangements and 
engaged through constructive diplomacy.  
• Before U.S. withdrawal, ANSF would be stable enough to establish the 
writ of the government.  
• The highest priority would be given to social sectors like education, 
health, and human resources, including female empowerment. 
• After the U.S. withdrawal, sustained economic growth and effective local 
revival would able to diminish the root causes of insurgency. 
b. Major Impediments 
• The triumph of this scenario depends on firm and long-term assurance 
form the worldwide community, which is still lacking.  
• Afghanistan’s history, internal disputes between ethnic groups and internal 
discontent do not favour this type of setting.  
• The present established capacity of the Afghan government is still below 
the desired standard needed to support this scenario.  
• Suitable and competent leadership, which is a prerequisite for a stable 
government, is only somewhat addressed at the present; the current 
government needs commitment to at least make it through the 
transformation decade while political consolidation becomes achievable. 
4. Probability of Scenario 
Though complex, this scenario is considered as the most ideal and optimistic, and 
represents the ultimate aim for all stakeholders—especially Pakistan. In fact, this scenario 
is less likely to achieve complete success. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the factors, with 
relative values, concluding that this scenario is 37 percent likely.  
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Table 2.   Probability Table—The Good Scenario 
S. 
No. Factors/Imperatives Value Remarks/Subject to 
1. Geostrategic and geopolitical inference 0  
2. Psycho-social environs in Afghanistan (socio-political factor) 0  
3. Afghanistan society (socio-political factor) 0  
4. Weak institutions, poverty, and weak education system (internal) 0  
5. Compounded governance/political stability (internal) 0.5 
If power-sharing formula is 
validated/strengthened 
6. Corruption (internal) 0  
7. Justice system (internal) 0  
8. Opium growth and drug business (internal) 0  
9. Afghan dependency on foreign resources (internal) 0.5  
10. 
Policy of reconciliation replaces policy of 
confrontation/integration of dissident 
factions (internal) 
0.5 If power-sharing formula is validated/strengthened 
11. 
Extremist elements/Taliban factor/war 
lords’ dominance reduces considerably 
(internal) 
0.5 If peace talks are held judiciously and succeed 
12. Taliban stays out on pretext of U.S. residual presence 0  
13. Efficacy of ANSF in future and military situation (internal) 0.5  
14. 
Internal stability vis-à-vis economic revival 
through FDI, especially by China and 
energy corridor process 
0.5 
Only accomplished with die-hard 
commitment of the Afghan government 
and people 
15. U.S. and international donors’ commitment for aid until economic revival/stability 0.5 Wishful 
16. U.S./NATO/ISAF keep their role limited to nation building/assistance 1 
Still depends on long-term interests of 
U.S. in the region 
17. U.S. long-term objectives in South Asia (external) 0  
18. Transition (external) 1  
19. U.S. policies and COIN vis-à-vis future stability in Afghanistan (external) 0.5 Effects of U.S. policies in last decade 
20. Presence of U.S. forces/Foreign troops in Afghanistan (external) 1  
21. Pakistan factor/bilateral relations based on non-interference (external) 0.5 
Wishful; subject to non-involvement of 
India in Afghan affairs 
22. Outsiders’ play (external) 0 Divergent strategies would keep going as long historic legacy 
23. UN peace keeping (external) 1  
Total  8.5/23 37-percent Probability 
Complete nullifying factor = 1 Mark 
Half nullifying factor = 0.5 Mark 
Unable to nullify factor = 0 
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B. THE BAD 
The Bad scenario is the most realistic one based on the current environment. 
Afghanistan’s overall future political and security landscape must take regional players’ 
perceptions into account—and the regional players have strong apprehensions regarding 
residual U.S. bases in Afghanistan beyond 2016, especially now that the United States’ 
major purpose, defeating al-Qaeda, has already been achieved. Mehmood Shah writes 
that “the presence of U.S. bases will not only remain unacceptable to many Afghans; 
Russia, China, the Central Asian republics, Iran, Pakistan, and possibly India too may 
have reservations regarding American presence in this region.”193 
Several factors that may emerge after the withdrawal period will affect this 
scenario: (1) U.S. negotiations to make the Taliban part of the Afghan government, (2) an 
intra-Afghan dialogue, supported by Pakistan, and (3) (the most likely factor) continuing 
negotiations and posturing along with use of force.194 Considering these factors, the most 
likely scenario expected to unfold during the post-withdrawal period features a multi-
party government, like the current setup, but with more transparent governance; Taliban 
support in their traditional areas, but relatively contained due to more proficient Afghan 
security forces; and, overall, a similar scenario as the current status quo, but slightly 
improved. “The Taliban are not likely to accept a U.S. presence on Afghan soil even if all 
other issues are amicably resolved between the two sides.”195 Regional powers like 
Russia and China may also strongly object to the residual U.S. bases, and the Northern 
Alliance may not accept the Taliban into the sustaining government. Due to the U.S. 
drawdown, Afghan citizens will have less confidence in the central government’s ability 
to establish its writ in the countryside. 
If reconciliation with the Taliban succeeds, the Taliban will have its share in 
Afghan governance—a short term success. If the Taliban is not included in the 
                                                 
193 Mehmood Shah, “Afghanistan beyond 2014,” The Dawn, Feb 1, 2013, http://dawn.com 
/2013/02/01/afghanistan-beyond-2014/. 
194 J. Vowell, “After 2014: The U.S./NATO Missions in Afghanistan,” e-International Relations, Dec 
17, 2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/17/after-2014-the-u-s-nato-missions-in-afghanistan/. 
195 Mehmood Shah, “Afghanistan beyond 2014.”  
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government, however, the group may choose to further recruit throughout the world, 
gathering strength and threatening global security. To prevent this eventuality, the 
Taliban’s concerns must be addressed. With the current state of affairs, the likely 
outcomes of this scenario (along with its uncertainties and implications) are outlined in 
the following subsections. 
1. Outline of Scenario/Likely Environment 
• This status-quo scenario would result in comparatively controlled 
instability in which reconciliation between all the factions/tribes and 
internal stakeholders remains vague.  
• Trends of corruption, bad governance, and nepotism would continue. 
• Insurgency would continue under a slow and uneasy reconciliation 
process. 
• The United States would maintain residual forces in order to train the 
ANSF. 
• The ANSF would continue its slow growth and remain heavily dependent 
on U.S. and foreign forces for financial aid, sustenance, and training in 
order to independently deal with radicals. 
• The Taliban’s major ingresses would be generally halted due to the 
presence of residual U.S. forces and a comparatively strengthened ANSF 
(in due course).  
• India would maintain influence through heavy investment and friendly 
relations with the Northern Alliance. 
2. Uncertainties 
• U.S. interests and future strategy in the region remain uncertain; however, 
the United States is likely to maintain a footprint in light of the fragile 
security environment and Afghanistan’s economic potential.  
• Regional consensus is uncertain due to regional players’ divergent 
interests. 
• In light of its present quality, the capability and credibility of the Afghan 
security apparatus in the immediate and near future will remain uncertain. 
• In light of its reputation, the Taliban’s future behavior remains uncertain. 
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3. Implications for Pakistan 
• Presently, Pakistan has improved relations with the current central Afghan 
government; however, the common phenomenon like convincing Afghans 
of Pakistan’s sincerity would remain a challenge. 
• The Afghan government and institutions (such as the intelligence agency) 
would continue to blame Pakistan for their inadequacies.  
• Pakistan may further engage itself in the reconstruction process in order to 
achieve its geo-economic interests. 
• If Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan does not somehow improve, it 
may create a dilemma for Pakistan, which is no longer able to support the 
Taliban due to its geo-political situation and domestic security and 
political objectives.  
• Gradually increasing stability inside Afghanistan would enable the return 
of millions of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, thus reducing Pakistan’s 
social and economic burden. Repatriation of refugees may not be possible, 
however, for some time still, and the burden on Pakistan will continue. 
• Pakistan’s recent Operation Zarb-e-Azb196 against TTP and other 
extremist groups would leave a strong message for the Afghan security 
apparatus to similarly tackle their side of the battle—to reconcile with the 
Taliban if possible or deal them tactfully with a whole-nation-approach 
coupled with Intel based operations (IBOs) through ANSF. 
• India would continue to interfere in Afghanistan’s affairs beyond 
reconstruction, exploiting any opportunity to further strengthen the non-
Pashtun groups, thus requiring Pakistan to keep taking countermeasures.  
• Because of India’s exaggerated presence inside Afghanistan, India’s 
sponsored unrest in Baluchistan would continue. 
• Stability and peace on Pakistan’s western border would remain a 
challenge.  
• Pakistan would have to make every effort to play a constructive role in 
order to prevent this scenario from turning into The Ugly scenario.  
                                                 
196 Zarb-e-Azb (ضرِب عضب ) is an Urdu word meaning to chop/cut by one of the personnel swords of 
Prophet Muhammad PBUH. This Operation is a joint military action being carried out by the Pakistan 
Armed Forces and LEAs against various terrorist/militant groups operating in Pakistan including the TTP, 
Lashkar-e-Jangvi, Al-Qaeda, Haqqani network, etc. It was launched in mid-2014.  
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4. Implications for Afghanistan, the Region, and the World 
• The presence of U.S. forces (or partial withdrawal) would benefit the 
ANSF in terms of training, expertise, and security/logistic assistance, but 
would not eliminate the threat of the Taliban altogether, which will 
continue “to fight against the infidels.”  
• There is a chance that the quest for power between different Taliban 
factions and ISIS may erupt, thus weakening their strength. This may 
provide an opportunity for the central government in Kabul and the United 
States to take control from the Taliban. 
• Afghanistan’s developmental and reconstruction pace would remain slow, 
meaning that the economic development needed to secure insurgent 
factions would cause continued dependence on external aid.  
• Afghanistan’s progress toward becoming an “energy corridor” would 
remain relatively slow. 
• Religious extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be further 
marginalized, ensuring effective control over drug trafficking and 
smuggling. 
• Despite regional countries’ (Iran, China, and Russia) concerns, continued 
U.S. presence in the region would contribute positively toward regional 
stability and provide an environment conducive to large-scale economic 
activity, including the long-awaited TAP pipeline project in the semi-near 
future. 
• Although it may be detrimental to the economic interests of both Iran and 
Russia, and although it may add to Iran’s security concerns, this scenario 
would address some of both countries’ concerns that are borne of an 
unstable Afghanistan, e.g., regional instability, spread of religious 
extremism, etc. 
• In the mid-future, the overall economic boost would create a financially 
viable environment for the Central Asian states in particular, but also for 
Russia and other regional countries in general. 
• Economically stable countries like China and India would maintain 
effective influence over the government through the use of aid/military 
training. 
Presently, there are no serious efforts to reconcile the Taliban with the 
mainstream, which is necessary for long-term prosperity. The Taliban may resurge when 
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U.S. forces begin to withdraw in 2016, as they did in 2014. All the stakeholders including 
the United States must understand the implications of fight and talks and talks while 
leaving. At the time of withdrawal from Afghanistan, to promote reconciling process with 
the Taliban would tend to support Taliban’s winning strategy: “Ok you are leaving, we 
can talk,” which then might happen on their terms. 
5. Probability of Scenario 
This scenario is considered the most realistic and therefore the most likely. 
Table 3.   Probability Table—The Bad Scenario 
S. 
No. Factors/Imperatives Value Remarks/Subject to 
1. Geostrategic and geopolitical inference 0  
2. Psycho-social environs in Afghanistan (socio-political factor) 0  
3. Afghanistan society (socio-political factor) 0  
4. Weak institutions, poverty, and weak education system (internal) 0.5 
If the power-sharing formula is 
validated/strengthened 
5. Compounded governance/political stability (internal) 0  
6. Corruption (internal) 0  
7. Justice system (internal) 0  
8. Opium growth and drug business (internal) 1  
9. Afghan dependency on foreign resources (internal) 0.5 
If the power-sharing formula is 
validated/strengthened 
10. 
Policy of reconciliation replaces policy of 
confrontation/integration of dissident 
factions (internal) 
0.5 If peace talks are held judiciously and succeed 
11. Extremist elements/Taliban factor/war lords’ dominance reduces considerably (internal) 0.5  
12. Taliban stays out on pretext of U.S. residual presence 0.5 
Only accomplished with die-hard 
commitment of the Afghan government 
and people 
13. Efficacy of ANSF in future and military situation (internal) 0.5 
Dependent on fulfilled commitment of 
international donners 
14. 
Internal stability vis-à-vis economic revival 
through FDI, especially by China and energy 
corridor process 
1 Still depends on long-term U.S. interests in the region 
15. U.S. and international donors’ commitment for aid until economic revival/stability 0  
16. U.S./NATO/ISAF keep their role limited to nation building/assistance 1  
17. U.S. long-term objectives in South Asia (external) 0.5 
Effects of U.S. policies driven in last 
decade 
18. Transition (external) 1  
19. U.S. policies and COIN vis-à-vis future 0.5 Wishful; subject to non-involvement of 
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S. 
No. Factors/Imperatives Value Remarks/Subject to 
stability in Afghanistan (external) India in Afghan affairs 
20. Presence of U.S. forces/Foreign troops in Afghanistan (external) 1  
21. Pakistan factor/bilateral relations based on non-interference (external) 1  
22. Outsiders’ play (external) 0 Divergent strategies continue as a long historic legacy 
23. UN peace keeping (external) 1  
Total  11/23 48-percent Probability 
Complete nullifying factor = 1 Mark 
Half nullifying factor = 0.5 Mark 
Unable to nullify factor = 0 
C. THE UGLY 
Feuding warlords. Dwindling aid channels. A crumbling economy. A pending 
food shortage. Internally and externally displaced people. A flourishing poppy trade. This 
is how Afghanistan will be described if events unfold against the desires of all 
stakeholders, including Pakistan and Afghanistan itself. Since 2001, Afghanistan has seen 
more failures than achievements, mostly due to factors beyond the control of the current 
government in Kabul, rooted in the country’s long history of civil strife. The biggest 
threat in the post-U.S. withdrawal period comes from the regional warlords who still not 
only exert great influence in their respective areas of control but also have strengthened  
more in the past few years. In The Ugly scenario, other assumptions may include the 
insurgency may continue; a civil war may erupt throughout the country; the central 
government may be too weak to fight against the regional warlords; and the constitution, 
which bestows vast power to the central government, may be diluted—divergent interests 
among ethnic groups and outside powers may also hinder an amicable solution. At worst, 
some radical faction such as the Taliban succeeds to power.197  
Amid such persistent turmoil, the Taliban can and will emerge as an alternative 
power structure by taking more than 80 percent–90 percent of Afghanistan’s territory in 
various parts of the country. Though it would currently be difficult for the Taliban to take 
                                                 
197 Noor ul Haq, “Afghanistan Future;” Naveed Mukhtar , “Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and 
Their Implications.”  
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and hold Kabul, given the combined strength of Afghan and American security forces, 
after 2016 the circumstances could lead to turmoil if not dealt with politically.198 
Foreseeing its vulnerabilities, the Afghan government has already sought to keep a larger 
residual U.S. force than the Obama administration wanted to maintain, consequently 
postponing withdrawal until 2016.199 This step shows that Afghanistan is still insecure—
that it must rely on foreign forces instead of emphasizing its self-reliance, training more 
local troops, enacting a free and fair political transformation, reconciling with all 
stakeholders to include the Taliban, state building, making trade partnerships, installing 
more physical infrastructures, and building more universities and colleges. 
The Ugly scenario is the most unfavorable scenario. It would have the most 
negative effects for all stakeholders, including Pakistan, due to the implications for the 
economy, national integration, internal security, foreign policy, and national 
development. Afghanistan’s internal instability—desperately in need of peace and 
security—would badly affect trade and economic activities in the region, and would be a 
detriment to the interests of the United States and the West. This scenario would be the 
result of foreign powers’ continued support of warring factions, and of other foreign 
powers’ desire to maintain the status quo. However, this scenario, which until recently 
was assessed as the most probable future scenario, is now becoming less likely. With 
residual forces likely to work against terrorism in Afghanistan—and with the Taliban 
considered a party to global terrorism—it is clear that the present situation is heading 
toward minimizing the Taliban. 
1. Outline of the Scenario/Likely Environment 
In this scenario, all foreign forces—compelled by economic considerations, 
military casualties, and intense public pressure—leave Afghanistan, creating a state of 
turmoil/chaos like that of 1989 after the withdrawal of Russian forces. The reconciliation 
                                                 
198 Arabinda Acharya and Antara Desai, “Afghanistan’s Post-2014 Futures?” Global Brief: World 
Affairs in 21st Century, October 3, 2012), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/10/03/afghanistans-post-2014-
futures/.  
199 Matthew Rosenberg, “Karzai Says U.S. Bases Can Stay, Raising Some Eyebrows in West,” (New 
York Times, 2013). 
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process has completely failed, the current government system has broken down due to its 
unjust non-inclusiveness, and the repercussions of the U.S. withdrawal have renewed 
insurgents’ vigour. This situation is favorable to Russia, India, China, and Iran. Though 
this outlook is pessimistic, it cannot yet be ruled out.  
The Ugly scenario is the worst-case scenario for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 
region. Under this scenario, civil war is a distinct possibility. The Afghan government 
could fail to exercise its complete authority across the country; fail to guarantee safety 
and security of Afghan people because of much weakened ANSF; fail to maintain law 
and order; and see most institutions collapse due to corruption and lack of financial 
support. “Fighting spreads to most parts of Afghanistan as the insurgents strive to 
institute local governance against a corrupt and ineffectual central authority.”200  
• Due to public pressure in EU countries and the United States, combined 
with a prolonged, fruitless war, the coalition forces would decide to pull 
out, thus creating a power vacuum. However, this depends on the presence 
of residual U.S. forces.  
• The power vacuum would create chaos, endangering the fragile regime, 
increasing warlordism, and creating open-ended Taliban power and 
extremism around the world. Afghanistan would become an even bigger 
threat to global security.  
• Due to failed peace talks and continued U.S. presence, the Taliban would 
gain renewed vigour. 
• The United States would be able to establish a heavy residual force after 
2016, set up either by negotiations or through the UN. 
• The reconciliation process would fail completely, with dissident elements 
left out of power. 
• The ANSF would become fragmented and join with various ethnic 
affiliations. 
• Civil war would intensify with stronger insurgency, causing the region to 
become more insecure. 
• The narcotics trade would boom. 
                                                 
200 Naveed Mukhtar , “Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and Their Implications.” 
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• An influx of refugees would flee to neighboring countries. 
2. Uncertainties 
• U.S. intentions concerning anti-terror policy are uncertain, but likely to 
shift toward the Middle East, or even to Pakistan, on the pretext of nuclear 
outreach. 
• Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban is uncertain but will face suspicion 
among the global community. 
• The extent to which regional players will seek to safeguard their national 
interests is uncertain. 
3. Implications for Pakistan 
• Civil war in Afghanistan would cause serious security concerns for 
Pakistan.  
• Russia, India, and Iran would exploit the situation to their favor. They 
would continue to support the Northern Alliance and other non-Pashtun 
parties against Pakistani-supported, Pashtun-dominated political parties. 
• Pakistan could be labeled a major co-conspirator of terrorism and solely 
responsible for unrest in Afghanistan. 
• FATA would become entangled in a new series of violence. 
• Pakistan may face increased drone attacks, or even surgical strikes, by the 
United States on the pretext of abetting terrorism. Such strikes may also be 
aimed to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.  
• The situation would pose a serious blow to Pakistan’s economic 
interests.201 
• Terrorist activity in India may result in general mobilization, further 
straining Pakistan militarily.  
• The insecure western border would create a two-front dilemma for 
Pakistan. 
  
                                                 
201 Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Projected Security Environments of Pakistan in Post-Afghanistan 
War Scenario,” (Summer 2011), 102–121. 
 79 
• TTP would pose more challenges to the Pakistani government, posing a 
bigger threat to regional security as well.202 
• Baluchistan may receive renewed insurgency strength under international 
arrangements.  
• The influx of refugees would further deteriorate economic conditions in 
Pakistan.203 
4. Afghanistan under UN Peace-Keeping Mission 
With the threat of extreme consequences should The Ugly scenario ensue, and in 
order to save face, foreign players could choose to unanimously pass a resolution that 
sends a UN peace-keeping force to Afghanistan. The likely environment would continue 
as follows.  
a. Likely Environment 
• The United States, under immense pressure from NATO and its own 
public, would pull troops from Afghanistan, citing increased casualties on 
both sides and prolonged conflict without any worthwhile results.  
• Major policy changes would occur as the United States and NATO forces 
leave Afghanistan.  
• The UN resolution would employ a multinational peace-keeping force 
with the clear mandate to bring peace and end civil turmoil.  
• The majority of warlords, the Afghan government, neighboring countries, 
and other major players would accept the UN mandate, and be either 
forced or willing to cooperate.  
• In the absence of NATO troops, Russian, Indian, and Iranian involvement 
would increasingly threaten internal stability in Afghanistan.  
• UN forces would stop hunting down Al Qaeda or the Taliban.  
• The scenario would play out against U.S. interests, as they would be 
forced to stop targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and would not be 
permitted to interfere in Afghanistan. 





Although The Ugly scenario’s best option is to hand over affairs to a UN peace-
keeping force; however, the dilemma may arise that troop-contributing states to the UN 
peace keeping force would might or might not be acceptable to Afghanistan and its 
neighboring countries.  
c. Implications for Pakistan 
• Relative peace in Afghanistan would bring reciprocating peace in 
Pakistani areas that border Afghanistan.  
• Pakistan might restore its image in the eyes of the Afghans, as well as the 
world at large, by taking part in reconstruction efforts.  
• Pakistan could serve as a base for the UN mission, since logistics will 
likely need to flow through Pakistan.  
Contrarily, if the UN peace-keeping force comprises countries like India, Pakistan 
would strongly resist that force and anarchy could ensue. 
5. Probability of Scenario 
This scenario is considered the most dangerous, undesirable, and unlikely. As 




Table 4.   Probability Table—The Ugly Scenario 
S. 
No. Factors/Imperatives Value Remarks/Subject to 
1. Geostrategic and geopolitical inference 0  
2. Psycho-social environs in Afghanistan (socio-political factor) 0  
3. Afghanistan society (socio-political factor) 0  
4. Weak institutions, poverty, and weak education system (internal) 0  
5. Compounded governance/political stability (internal) 0  
6. Corruption (internal) 0  
7. Justice system (internal) 0  
8. Opium growth and drug business (internal) 0  
9. Afghan dependency on foreign resources (internal) 0  
10. 
Policy of reconciliation replaces policy of 
confrontation/integration of dissident factions 
(internal) 
0  
11. Extremist elements/Taliban factor/war lords’ dominance reduces considerably (internal) 0 ANSF is fragmented 
12. Taliban stays out on pretext of U.S. residual presence 0  
13. Efficacy of ANSF in future and military situation (internal) 0  
14. 
Internal stability vis-à-vis economic revival 
through FDI, especially by China and energy 
corridor process 
0  
15. U.S. and international donors’ commitment for aid until economic revival/stability 1 
Still depends on long-term U.S. 
interests in the region 
16. U.S./NATO/ISAF keep their role limited to nation building/assistance 0  
17. U.S. long-term objectives in South Asia (external) 1  
18. Transition (external) 0  
19. U.S. policies and COIN vis-à-vis future stability in Afghanistan (external) 0  
20. Presence of U.S. forces/Foreign troops in Afghanistan (external) 0  
21. Pakistan factor/bilateral relations based on non-interference (external) 0  
22. Outsiders’ play (external) 0  
23. UN peace keeping (external) 0  
Total  2/23 9-percent Probability 
Complete nullifying factor = 1 Mark 
Half nullifying factor = 0.5 Mark 
Unable to nullify factor = 0 
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6. Comparative Analysis 
Table 5 provides a comparative analysis of the three scenarios. 
Table 5.   Probability Table—Comparative Analysis 
 
  
Scenarios The Good The Bad The Ugly 
Desirability Essential Better than nothing Least desirable 
Probability Less likely but possible Most likely Cannot be ruled out 
Benefit Win-win situation Sustainable None 
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V. ANALYSIS AND WAY FORWARD 
The Afghan end game and regional stability in South Asia are directly related to 
global peace. The situation requires an approach that unifies international and regional 
players as well as the Afghans themselves. This chapter discusses relevant conclusions 
drawn from the previous chapters and provides a broad strategic synopsis for the 
Afghanistan crisis. 
ISAF and ANSF were unable to defeat the Taliban by December 2014, when 
U.S.-led forces were originally postured to withdraw; neither is it likely to make any 
considerable difference before the end of 2016. Predictably, the Taliban has become more 
assertive in the regions where U.S. forces have vacated, such as the Wardak province in 
the east. When the United States vacated Combat Post Conlon, it left the Afghan 
government and troops in control. Within weeks, Afghan forces were severely restricted 
by the insurgents. Although the ANSF is now more trained and equipped, it may still not 
be able to control Afghanistan’s vast territory after 2016. The ANSF still needs military 
assistance from willing countries, such as the United States—even after the security 
agreement expires—Pakistan, or, at worst, the UN. The Karzai government tried to make 
a military agreement with India, but India was not willing to out-rightly sign a pact for 
Indian military presence in Afghanistan, save for training assistance to the Afghan troops 
and rebuilding measures after 2016; India does not want to fight someone else’s war in a 
country that could make India vulnerable to terrorism.204 Despite all endeavors to 
strengthen the ANSF, if the Taliban has succeeded in pushing the world’s most powerful 
militaries to withdraw, the Afghan army is unlikely to stand in their way. “This is the 
fourth time in 150 years of Afghanistan’s turbulent history that the country is recreating 
the state military following its total disintegration caused by foreign invasions or civil 
wars.”205  
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The Afghan establishment seems much dependent on foreign troops, in some 
number, for its security. Whenever these foreign troops do leave, chaos will ensue unless 
the Taliban—which has at least better “authority to control” the complex Afghan nation 
through their religious beliefs—is included in the political process Otherwise, the ANSF 
would need to become powerful enough to enforce state legitimacy across the country. 
The only option for Afghanistan’s long-term prosperity is to bring the Taliban into the 
mainstream political process; Pakistan advocates this approach. The process must 
furthermore be Afghan-led and inclusive of all stakeholders, e.g., the Afghan 
government, Pakistan, the United States, and Afghan political parties. Pakistan’s role 
must be limited to facilitation only.206 The process of reconciliation is generally favored 
by at least two important stakeholders—Pakistan and the United States—who understand 
that long-term positive results will come from talking to the Taliban rather than isolating 
them. Iran and India, on the other hand, would probably be unhappy if this option were 
exercised.207  
If reconciliation does not occur with the Taliban, the situation is likely to be more 
dangerous for Pakistan. Under such circumstances, the resistance of the Taliban against a 
weak Afghan national government—overseen by the United States—will divide 
Afghanistan and will keep the area hostile. The spillover of insurgency and influx of 
refugees into Pakistan’s tribal areas will reemerge, and the issue will remain 
unresolved.208 Few pertinent geo-strategic compulsions or the study points about the 
internal as well as external aspects of Afghanistan are discussed in the next section. 
A. ANALYSIS 
1. Transition upon Withdrawal 
As international security interests compete and evolve, the transition in 
Afghanistan will depend on the development of its government and security forces, 
negotiations, and the country’s value to and commitment from the United States. Success 
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will be determined by how events transpire rather than a set of specific, predetermined 
goals. One thing is certain: no one will get what he or she wants from this war, and 
compromise is necessary for peace. Therefore, Afghanistan’s goal should remain focused 
on training and organizing the Afghan army, developing a strong central government that 
is capable of enforcing laws, and retaining the goodwill of the United States and the West 
in general. Similarly, the threat of extra-territorial terrorism will likely force Afghanistan 
to depend upon international security arrangements; the continued presence of ISAF and 
the United States will likely remain a security requirement. Other regional players, 
however (such as China, Russia, and Iran) may feel threatened by continued U.S. 
presence in the region, which endangers their vital trade interests. The emerging Afghan 
government must consider the complex sensitivities, motives, and interests that will 
affect national integration and stability. 
2. Long-term Commitment of International Players  
Each previously mentioned challenge in this thesis requires a comprehensive 
strategy and long-term commitment. The Afghans themselves must establish security and 
rule of law throughout the country, but they will require “financial assistance and 
political support from the international community” for at least the next decade, allowing 
time for the Afghan economy to grow.209 There is no denying the Pakistan’s strategic 
role in post-2016 Afghanistan, as emphasized by the EU and other world players; 
Pakistan could play a vital role during the transition and economic rehabilitation, and in 
broader counter-terrorism terms as well.210 Afghanistan must further engage regional 
players such as Pakistan and the CARs for broader regional, economic, and political 
stability, trade, intelligence sharing, and institution development during the 
“transformation decade.”  
Additionally, permanent peace also depends upon regional cooperation among 
Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, and the United States and Russia’s non-interference at the 
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international level. The problems in Afghanistan have been compounded by the 
interference of the neighboring states, namely, India, Iran, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and 
Uzbekistan, which shows how deeply involved regional powers are in the situation.211  
At the domestic level, the lasting peace in Afghanistan calls for a long-term 
power-sharing arrangement among different ethnic and religious groups.212 Regrettably, 
Afghan society is too polarized and fragmented to embark on an effective peace process 
alone. Nor is there any other single country in the region in a position to mediate the 
warring factions. Though there is some stability at present, it is fragile and could 
deteriorate at any moment. A neutral, impartial, and commonly accepted forum, such as 
the UN, is needed to broker peace among the Afghans and to persuade them to honor 
peace pledges and settle their differences. The Afghans have two choices moving 
forward: a peace settlement through a political process, or the risk of their country 
disintegrating.213 
However, only a solution that is fully supported by Pakistan and Iran can bring 
peace and stability to war-torn Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that the two countries have 
been reluctant to discuss or agree upon a path toward resolution. Each country has its 
own clear objectives, hoping that a turn of events might fulfill those objectives. It is high 
time that Pakistan and Iran put their cards on the table and discuss frankly what they 
want, and how they can help Afghanistan. Afghan leaders have shown time and again 
their inability to strike a compromise. It is possible that a combined, friendly push from 
Pakistan and Iran could lead the Afghans toward comprehensive, long-term settlement.214 
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3. Strategic Equation in South Asia 
The regional stability in South Asia is strongly linked with strategic balance—or 
imbalance—between India and Pakistan. India’s interests and interference in Afghanistan 
complicates the region’s strategic equation. General Stanley McChrystal notes:  
While India’s activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing 
Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions 
and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.215 
In other words, increased Indian influence in Afghanistan outside the realm of 
development creates security apprehensions for other neighboring countries like Pakistan, 
and exacerbates regional tensions. 
Instability in Afghanistan would implicate the entire region. If India continues to 
push for policy that negatively affects Pakistan, India will receive only short-term gains. 
Whether India completely stamps Pakistan off the world map (which is not possible 
considering Pakistan’s military strength) or simply inflicts minor setbacks, regional 
instability will suffer in the short-term, and India will suffer in the long-term—After 
2016, India would be more vulnerable to Bombay attacks like incidents from spillover 
insurgency or Jihadists from Afghanistan. 
Different countries in South Asia have interpreted the United States’ future 
intentions in different ways, thus complicating the overall security situation. Internal and 
external stakeholders are divided into pro- and anti-U.S. groups, working to secure 
individual and group interests. Taking our cue from similar historical power struggles, the 
resultant vacuums, and subsequent power efforts, it is likely that another power struggle 
among the United States and other key regional stakeholders will ensue after the 2016 
drawdown.  
In short, each player is reaching toward different goals, using non-coherent 
strategies. They are primarily unable to reach common ground because of their 
domestically driven politics. Pakistan has logical security concerns about increased 
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Indian involvement in Afghan politics. India strives for a non-Pashtun government 
preferably Northern Alliance to marginalize Pakistan influence, also supplemented by 
Iran’s views for supporting Northern Alliance to elevate Shiite minority in Afghanistan. 
Russia also aligns with India and Iran’s agenda, like in the ‘70s when they supported the 
Northern Alliance in order to keep the CARs out of others’ influence, defend against 
extremism spillover, and prevent the United States from reaching in from the Pakistan–
Afghan corridor. The South Asian pot will similarly remain boiling during Afghanistan’s 
transformation, affecting the pace of development.  
4. Future Influences 
Following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2016, 
countries in this region are likely to see a major shift in political alliances, and the 
influence of power players in the region is likely to change owing to present and pressing 
geo-political and economic realities. 
Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN, rightly 
highlighted: 
America’s “Pivot” is consequential to Pakistan’s security challenges. The 
pivot is widely seen here, as aimed to contain China’s rise, even as 
America simultaneously pursues economic engagement with Beijing. If 
this policy involves an endeavor to build India as a counterweight to 
China, this will have implications for South Asian stability. U.S. plans to 
supply India advanced weaponry and technology will accentuate the 
growing conventional and strategic asymmetry between Pakistan and India 
and further undermine the delicate regional equilibrium.216 
This situation has led Pakistan to pursue relationships with other power states, like 
Russia—shown by the Russian defense minister’s visit to Pakistan last year, and 
economic agreements between the two countries.217 
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The SCO is pivotal in the emerging multipolar world. With Russia and China as 
core members, this organization will play an important role in fortifying the foundations 
of the world order. As a regional body, the SCO is likely to act as a counter-weight to 
NATO. Pakistan’s relations with both Russia and China will determine not only the 
regional strategic scenario, but also Pakistan’s national interests in the region. In this 
context, Pakistan’s bid for permanent membership in the SCO would be a major step 
toward a proactive and extended role in the region.  
Under all these emergent circumstances, there are apprehensions about post-2016 
power asymmetry at both the global and regional levels. Each player’s agenda and 
interests will affect regional stability. Leading U.S. and Western maritime coalitions in 
the Gulf of Oman and Aden, as a “show of force,” may minimize or relocate to the Asian 
Pacific, as per the United States’ Asia Rebalancing Strategy. Another hypothesis is that 
the United States, with no further interest left in Pakistan, may turn toward India for 
future strategic partnership against China. If the United States, NATO, and India emerge 
together, then an alliance between China, Russia, and Pakistan may form. The possible 
strategic partnerships affecting South Asia are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Prospects of Future Alliances  
Possible—Nexus Probability Remarks 
U.S.–Pakistan–Afghanistan Likely (50/50) Most desired to stabilize Afghanistan in the long run. 
Russia–India–Afghanistan Less likely (30/70) If the United States aligns with India, then it may be possible. 
India–Iran–Afghanistan Likely at regional level (50/50) 
It is the desire of India, but depends 
upon Afghanistan, if its people decide to 
exclude Pakistan from their affairs. 
India–U.S.–Afghanistan Likely, but at a later time (30/70) 
It might occur once the United States is 
fully aligned with India. But it will pose 
a tangible threat to Pakistan’s security. 
Pakistan–Iran–Afghanistan Less likely (30/70) 
Both Iran and India have Pakistan as an 
economic rival in Afghanistan. But it is a 




In order to work toward The Good scenario, it is necessary to plan where and how 
efforts will be applied during and after the transition. As the U.S. commander in 
Afghanistan reminded us in 2009, it is never too late to pursue a “Winning Hearts and 
Minds Strategy.”218 For a smooth withdrawal from Afghanistan, earnest endeavors must 
target the root causes of the growing Afghan insurgency, global terrorism, and regional 
instability—notably, poverty and privation and their “collateral damage”—which make 
the people vulnerable to exploitation by extremist organizations.  
To improve upon the most likely future scenario (The Bad), it is imperative to 
quantify, prioritize, and finally deal with problems zealously. Afghanistan today faces 
four major problems, which all players—including Pakistan—should strive to help solve 
ideological problems, political problems, economic problems, and military deficits. If we 
had learned from the example of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the 
Osama Bin Laden factor may not have developed a decade later. Broadly, state-building 
measures, established supremacy of law and human rights, rapid economic growth, strong 
Afghan National Security Forces, and the “ruling over hearts and minds” concept are a 
few of the bottom-line objectives; if not achieved in the post-2016 transformation decade, 
the devastating fictional scenario described in the introduction of this thesis could 
become a reality. 
5. Reciprocal Efforts from Pakistan and Afghanistan  
Pakistan and Afghanistan both have several policy options moving forward. In the 
past, Afghan regimes have pursued unfriendly policies toward Pakistan; however, current 
circumstances call for pragmatic cordiality over the next decade. Pakistan must ensure 
constructive engagement at all levels in order to enhance Pakistan’s leverage and promote 
its self-interest in Afghan affairs. However, Pakistan needs to avoid past pitfalls and 
abstain from picking favorites. Similarly, policy formulation must be informed by 
Afghanologists, sociologists, and anthropologists to ensure a constructive approach 
toward peace and long-term solidarity in Afghanistan. At the same time, as Pakistan will 
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prominently bear the effects of the war in Afghanistan, international players and the 
Afghans themselves must involve Pakistan in major strategic agreements, including 
peace talks with the Taliban. The following subsections outline the necessary steps for 
bilateral, mutual dialogues between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with a focus on Pakistan’s 
contributions. 
a. Mutual Trust Building 
Mutual trust building is the key to affecting harmony and stability between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal. Both countries desperately need to 
sincerely build and strengthen mutual ties. To build trust, both countries must interact 
more frequently at all levels. Trust can only be gained through good foreign policy and 
positive diplomacy from both sides.  
b. Strategic Partnership Agreement and Treaty of Friendship 
Pakistan and Afghanistan need to revive their bilateral relations by exploring 
common grounds and new prospects. To start, they should initiate a bilateral “treaty of 
friendship and cooperation.” The treaty should require comprehensive engagements, such 
as economic cooperation, mutual sports and cultural ventures, crossover visits, military 
assistance, and exchange of educational expertise. Subsequently, Pakistan should work to 
solidify a strategic partnership agreement (SPA) with Afghanistan that would provide a 
framework for mutual relations in various fields. Afghanistan has already signed SPAs 
with the United States and India. Doing so with Pakistan would increase person-to-person 
interaction by initiating job training exchange programs in the education field, organizing 
combined cultural activities, and extending assistance in Afghan reconstruction by 
providing technical expertise in agricultural and IT departments.  
c. Inter-Afghanistan–Pakistan Sports Activities 
In pursuance of the aforementioned treaty of friendship and SPA, inter-country 
sports activities are a quick means for positive social interaction. Sports, in addition to 
being healthy activities, can also create diplomacy—they can serve as a confidence-
building measure to improve bilateral relations. Indo–Pak cricket is an example of this 
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diplomatic tool’s ability to ease inter-state tensions. Sports activities like cricket and 
football may help normalize social contact between the two countries and create a lively 
atmosphere in the Afghan public that may otherwise distrust Pakistanis.  
d. Outstanding Issue Resolution 
To bring stability to the region, both Afghanistan and Pakistan must resolve their 
existing issues, such as the Durand Line dispute. The Durand Line has been a constant 
obstacle in Pak–Afghan relations, and its resolution could help curtail cross-border 
terrorism and other illegal activities. Pakistan should involve the international community 
to resolve the issue once and for all, as it will only aggravate the future security situation. 
Due to domestic political compulsions and other factors—such as India’s influence in 
Afghanistan—the Durand Line issue cannot be settled in the current political 
environment; however, it may be resolved through gradual improvement in cross-border 
checking mechanisms or SOPs, immigration formalities, taxation, or other methods. By 
mutually agreeing to a security arrangement at the border area, both countries would 
directly benefit from improved trust and confidence. 
e. Close Coordination between Security Forces 
In the recent past, minor border violations have been a source of conflict between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The countries should establish a joint committee/monitoring 
team to observe crossover incidents and avoid any further conflict. Because both 
countries are enduring a similar internal security situation regarding terrorism, they must 
collaborate closely to fight a common enemy. Pakistan must continue Operation Zarb-e-
Azb in its FATA areas with a whole-of-nation approach until the country is free of 
terrorism and has set a policy to “Clear, Hold, Build and Transfer” in order to deal with 
terrorism’s effects. The ANSF can conduct similar operations on the Afghanistan side. 
Although the ANSF may require help from U.S. forces at first, they would also have to 
be actively engaged for cooperation with Pakistan after U.S. withdrawal.  
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f. Curbing Terrorism/Militancy through Economic Cooperation 
Peace attracts investments; however, investments and economic endeavors alone 
do not bring about peace. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan may not sustain any long-term 
economic activity, as both faces the same set of security challenges regarding militancy. 
It is appropriate for the two countries to cooperate and try to get willing factions/the 
Taliban on their side and in the mainstream. This will increase the willing factions’ stake 
in governmental affairs by giving them a share of the economic routes passing through 
the areas they occupy. For instance, in Pakistan, all energy/economic corridors generally 
pass through disturbed areas of Baluchistan and FATA. The respective governments must 
give royalties to the locals for any resources—such as gas and oil—that are extracted 
from their land. This will make them an active element in society and a governmental 
stakeholder.  
6. Future Methodology/Efforts Required by Pakistan  
The internal and external situation in Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal will 
depend entirely on the prevailing environment. There are innumerable opportunities for 
Pakistan, which, if assessed and capitalized on properly, can greatly support Pakistan’s 
policy objectives. To further safeguard its national interests and ensure its own 
security/stability (in terms of mitigating the de-stabilizing effect on its western frontier in 
KPK and Baluchistan) Pakistan alone needs to articulate comprehensive policy measures. 
Pakistan should remain effectively engaged with the present Afghan government, and 
should take apt measures to create an environment that will help stabilize Afghanistan in 
the long-term. Some contours of the recommended policy are summarized as follows.219  
a. At the Global/Regional Level 
• Pakistan must argue its case to the world community on the diplomatic 
front. Pakistan must help international players realize that Pakistan is the 
country that can be most influential in Afghan affairs, and therefore should 
not be excluded from the peace process as it has been in the past. To 
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facilitate this, Pakistan must establish close ties with all stakeholders 
involved in the Afghan matrix. 
• Pakistan should not avoid marginalizing other stakeholders’ desires. 
Pakistan must endeavor to supplement rather than substitute its ties with 
any single state. Pakistan ought to find balance between alliances with the 
United States and China, and with Russia if deemed necessary.  
• To mitigate distrust between Pakistan and the United States, both 
countries should build trust and communication through formal channels, 
avoiding the media—coercive diplomacy through the media is not a viable 
way forward. 
• To remain relevant and avoid isolation in the region, Pakistan must build 
closer ties with Russia, perhaps with help from China, and realign its 
foreign policy with Iran. 
• The Durand Line dispute, though still a low-key affair, may escalate in the 
future. Because Pakistan has suffered the worst effects of the war in 
Afghanistan and yet has still remained a U.S. ally in the GWOT, the 
United States must convince Afghanistan to accept the Durand Line as an 
international border. 
• To enhance its credibility, Pakistan should involve other countries like 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia in security pacts with Afghanistan.  
• Because Pakistan has tremendous economic potential, Pakistan should 
involve China in its economic endeavors, such as projects like CPEC. For 
example, development of communication infrastructure—such as a 
railway link from Pakistan to the CARs that travel through Afghanistan—
or investment from China in the TAPI pipeline project. 
• Pakistan can serve as an energy corridor through the CARs, which will 
help bring peace and prosperity to the region and an economic lift for 
Pakistan.  
• Pakistan must intensify cooperation under the OIC, Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO), SCO, UN, Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, and SAARC. 
Pakistan must keep interacting with all regional countries including 
through new forums to safeguard its interests in the region.  
• The increased number of Indian consulates along Pakistan’s western 
border is a constant annoyance for Pakistan, especially with concrete 
evidence of Indian involvement in Baluchistan. Pakistan—in addition to 
seeking closure of these consulates with Afghanistan—may find it fruitful 
 95 
to raise the issue at an international forum. If proof of Indian involvement 
in Baluchistan is shared with the UN and other international forums in 
which Pakistan is a member, it could be more rigorously pursued. 
• Clear and strong policies should be devised to deal with ISIS, though it 
has yet to pose a credible threat to South Asia. Saudi Arabia recently led 
an Islamic country coalition against terrorism; though it has yet to prove 
its worth, it could certainly improve the overall image of Muslims and 
Islam as a religion of peace.  
b. At the National/Government Level 
Pakistan’s efforts at the international and regional levels can only prevail if 
similar efforts are executed at the national level with a whole-of-nation approach. 
(1) Policy of Constructive Bilateral Engagement  
Pakistan must continue to pursue measures for better cooperation at all levels to 
protect its lasting interests in Afghanistan. Such measures may include: 
• Pakistan must determine how involved it should be inside Afghanistan. In 
the past, the ambitious though misplaced desire for geographical depth 
through manipulation of Afghan politics has had poor results. Pakistan’s 
efforts should be directed toward developing a stable Afghanistan, without 
the impression of being a power broker in Afghanistan. 
• Pakistan will be the single greatest benefactor from stability in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan should therefore distance itself from Afghanistan’s 
internal polity. A policy of non-interference may prove more productive 
for Pakistan to ensure lasting strategic benefits. Pakistan should keep 
helping the Afghan government conduct peace talks with the Taliban. 
• It is common belief that Afghanistan will be stifled if Torkham and 
Chaman are closed for one day. This may be tactically effective; however, 
regional competitors are ready to cash in on any such venture by Pakistan. 
If Pakistan is looking at Central Asia via Afghanistan, then the new 
definition of cooperation should be on the basis of economic (rather than 
political) inter-dependence, since, presently, Afghanistan is viewed as 
merely a dependent country. 
• Influence in Afghanistan, presently, is gauged in terms of economic 
assistance provided by a country. India is aware of this, and has gained 
sufficient space in Kabul. To compete for national interests, Pakistan has 
to invest heavily in Afghanistan at the government level. Pakistani 
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investors must also be encouraged to invest in development projects in 
Afghanistan. 
• Pakistan should help Afghanistan develop smoothly functioning 
government infrastructure and create suitable economic conditions for 
achieving long-term stability after U.S. withdrawal. 
• Pakistan must continue to provide assistance to Afghanistan on various 
projects. The projects, once announced, must be completed on time.  
• Pakistan may provide support for all potential departments, e.g., 
security/defence sectors, banking, healthcare, education, trade, and 
industry. 
• Any belligerent-sounding Afghan speech-making like the one seen in 
President Ashraf Ghani’s address during the recent 6th Heart of Asia 
Conference in Amritsar must be taken positively and overreaction should 
be avoided to strengthen bilateral relations. 
• Keeping in view Afghan sociology, experts on Afghan affairs and think 
tanks might profitably be involved to formulate a long-term foreign policy 
for Afghanistan. 
• Close trade ties can be established by offering a free trade agreement or 
enhanced concessions in Afghan transit trade, and by developing an 
effective market for Pakistani goods.  
• To recapture the Afghan market, Pakistan should schedule exclusive 
exhibition of construction materials, food items, light engineering goods, 
and medicines in Afghanistan; representatives from major chambers of 
commerce and industry should visit Afghanistan every year, and customs 
procedures may be made more convenient for imports/exports with 
Afghanistan. 
• Pakistan must help Afghanistan create the much-desired energy corridor. 
This is not only important for economic uplift in the region, but also for 
creating an economic stake for all factions. Eventually, Pakistan will 
greatly benefit from the proposed corridor. 
• Effective utilization of the energy conduit offered by Afghanistan for 
carrying Central Asian hydrocarbons to warm waters in the Arabian Sea, 
through Gwadar Port. 
• In order to attract the CARs for trade, Pakistan should develop requisite 
infrastructure inside Afghanistan. Some steps to this end have been taken 
but the Indian-built Delaram-Zaranj Highway has directly challenged the 
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prospects of Pakistan’s trade with the CARs. It is important that, instead of 
falling back on the old rhetoric and blaming India, Pakistan should pursue 
development of suitable communication infrastructure inside Afghanistan. 
Construction of a railway line linking Landi Kotal and Central Asia should 
be a priority. 
• Some Afghan ethnic groups harbor hostility toward Pakistan, largely 
because of its role in the ’90s. Taking its lead from Indian relations with 
different ethnic groups, Pakistan should also establish renewed relations 
and maintain close/constructive ties with other ethnic groups in the 
country, especially the Tajiks and Hazaras. Overreaction by Afghan 
leaders must be avoided. Disputes in bilateral relations should be resolved 
through dialogue and negotiations.  
• Pakistan should continue to support any means that lead to settlement of 
the war through negotiations. Pakistan should not support any single group 
or groups, or play favorites. It must urge all those concerned to join the 
reconciliation process. Pakistan has just as much to gain from a peaceful, 
self-ruled Afghanistan as it has lost from a turbulent neighbor. 
• Rather than generalized statements, Pakistan needs to confront the Afghan 
authorities with facts and figures about Indian diplomats’ anti-Pakistan 
activities. 
• To minimize the economic burden and resolve socio-political problems, 
Afghan refugees currently residing in Pakistan must be repatriated. The 
government should pursue an agreement with Afghanistan before the 
complete withdrawal of U.S. troops for repatriation of refugees. This can 
only be achieved through constructive engagement with all factions to 
ensure peace; help from the United States and UN is also needed to ensure 
a guaranteed repatriation and to avoid another wave of refugees should 
The Bad scenario play out.  
• The Afghan government has the liberty to improve its relations with India; 
however, the Afghan government needs to prevent India from using 
Afghan land for anti-Pakistan activities. 
c. Pakistan’s Measures at the Armed Forces Level 
Pakistan’s strong armed forces must also play a role in the whole-of-government 
approach.  
• Effective Border Management. In addition to constructive engagement 
with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s armed forces must maintain security along 
the western border until the environment in Afghanistan is safe. The 
armed forces must be ready to tackle any spillover effect while the United 
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States withdraws from the region, and for another four to five years after. 
Moreover, efforts should be made for closer cooperation and coordination 
with the ANA to formulate a comprehensive border management plan.  
• Training/Assistance to the ANSF. It is in Pakistan’s long-term interests to 
constructively engage with the ANSF, play an active role in its capacity 
building, and foster friendly/long-lasting ties to help ensure permanent 
peace in Afghanistan. The assistance may take the following forms: 
• At present, the ANSF is being trained by a host of countries, including 
India. Despite Pakistan’s offers, the Afghan government has not agreed to 
send troops for training in Pakistan, apparently due to Indian pressure. 
Pakistan should actively push the current government to send more troops 
to Pakistan for training, especially to send officers and cadets to the 
Pakistan Military Academy. In this regard, the provision of better facilities 
may soften Afghanistan’s stance.  
• Efforts may be made for joint military exercises on a regular basis.  
• Most importantly, Pakistan should provide critical military equipment and 
munitions at competitive prices or as aid. 
• Joint operation centers along the border should be increased for better 
coordination. 
• Pakistan may continue intelligence interaction with the National 
Directorate of Security at the highest level. A number of wrong 
perceptions can be corrected through dialogue. 
• In order to curb the cross-border infiltration and to end the blame game, 
Pakistan should emphasize joint monitoring of the border by combined 
teams of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and NATO forces. 
d. Pakistan’s Measures in the Social Sector 
Pakistan must make an effort to maintain and further enhance existing social and 
cultural ties, which can ultimately strengthen both countries. 
• Assistance in Reform and Capacity Building. Pakistan must offer 
assistance in bringing reforms and capacity building for social 
development. Such areas as crossover training and sharing of skilled 
human resource and expertise may be exploited in this regard.220   
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• Winning Hearts and Minds. Deployment of Pakistani doctors, teachers, 
technicians, and social workers can have deep effects on Afghan society. 
The Pakistani government should encourage the private sector to fill 
vacancies and scholarships in public sector colleges and universities in 
order to bring the two countries closer. 
• Increase in Imports. “Afghanistan’s population is heavily dependent upon 
Pakistan for the import of wheat, rice, and grains”; Pakistan must adopt a 
viable government policy to exploit such economic leverages in 
Afghanistan.221  
• Media. No media cooperation currently exists between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, regardless of the impact of Afghanistan’s affairs on Pakistan. 
India, however, has reasonable representation in Afghan print and 
electronic media. Comprehensive media policy backed by proactive 
foreign policy toward Afghanistan would change the local and regional 
approaches/public opinion in favor of Pakistan dramatically. Pakistan 
should take immediate steps to provide assistance in training and 
combined production of programs to Afghan private television channels. 
The popularity of Geo and AVT Khyber in Afghanistan may be exploited 
to give Pakistan’s official stance on contemporary issues. 
e. Stability on the Homefront  
External challenges cannot be faced until our own house is in order. Pakistan must 
achieve political stability and must uproot extremism and violence, in any form. This 
would also help Pakistan attain foreign direct investment. Pakistan must therefore reach 
out to all stakeholders in this regard. The following priorities may help it do so: 
• Eliminate Terror Bases. In addition to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan 
must eliminate the existential threat from terrorists based in various parts 
of the country, particularly FATA. This will not only satisfy the world 
community, but will have self-preservation effects.  
• Put FATA in the Mainstream. FATA will remain central in any Afghan 
policy due to its geographical contiguity with Afghanistan. FATA has 
long remained detached and neglected from mainstream Pakistan. A 
comprehensive strategy has to be followed to bring FATA into the 
mainstream by making it part of KPA Province; these efforts go hand-in-
hand with bringing aadministrative reforms to establish the writ of the 
state and address its vulnerabilities. 
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• Control of Smuggling. Pakistan is the single largest trade partner of 
Afghanistan,222 yet, due to smuggling, the local market remains under 
pressure and the government loses revenue. Pakistan must make mutual 
arrangements regarding control of informal trade with Afghanistan.  
• Control of Narcotics. Opium production in Afghanistan, especially after 
the Soviet invasion, has adversely affected Pakistan. Pakistan should 
enforce strict border control mechanisms to stop the flow of drugs and it is 
not helping Afghanistan in this regard. 
7. Future Methodology/Efforts Required by Afghans Themselves  
Despite its historic over-dependence on external recognition and support, the 
future of the Afghan State will depend on its successful internal transformation. All 
players, including neighbors, may lose their desire to help after U.S. withdrawal. To 
survive on their own, the Afghans must set progressive goals for their future prosperity. 
Some pertinent points, described in the following subsections, will aid their efforts. 
a. A Stable Afghan Government 
Several factors demand that the Afghan government in Kabul act with greater 
farsightedness and wisdom: the need to shun or isolate the Taliban, the need to attain 
economic aid for reconstruction, the ongoing war on terrorism, and the prospects of 
acting as a trade conduit between the CARs and the rest of the world. A stable 
government is necessary before progressive reconstruction can begin. At present, the 
main policy objective for all players and stakeholders should be to make the Afghan 
government capable of surviving the U.S. withdrawal. “Strategy should differentiate 
three areas and allocate resources accordingly: strategic cities and transportation routes 
that must be under total Afghan/alliance control; buffers around strategic areas, where 
NATO and the Afghan Army would focus their struggle against insurgents; and 
opposition territory, where NATO and Afghan forces would not expend effort or 
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resources.”223 Above all, every constitutional and non-governmental activity in 
Afghanistan is to be owned by the government, the Afghan people, and all political 
parties. 
b. Reconciliation through a Legitimate Central Government 
To establish legitimacy and rule of law, the government needs: sincere 
reconciliation; proportionate participation of all provinces, ethnicities, and tribes; and 
representation of minorities and women. These factors would also help bring all groups 
and war lords to a unified platform. It would further assist in demilitarisation of private 
armies and minimize chances of developing states within the state. Only then will the 
stage be set for proper/constructive legislation and political consolidation. 
c. Reconciliation through Counter-Terrorism  
The remnants of the Taliban must be involved in the state structure, as their 
continued demonization will be counterproductive for sociological reasons. Through 
meaningful reconciliation with the Taliban and other factions, a democratic government 
may form a strong center. The Taliban may be classified into categories, as the entire 
Pashtun population cannot be branded as Taliban, and all Taliban are not Al-Qaeda 
operatives with a global agenda. Constructive engagement might thus be successful. Help 
may come from religious establishments in Pakistan or from similar schools of thought 
elsewhere.  
d. Less Foreign Involvement 
The Afghan government must quickly undertake such steps that can improve its 
sway across the country and lessen reliance on foreign presence —either through ANSF 
actions, or through visible rehabilitation projects. When the Taliban raises concerns about 
foreign occupation in Afghanistan, the concerns can be countered only if the government 
is more capable of functioning on its own rather than always relying on foreign 
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assistance. If the Afghan people want a lasting change to make Afghanistan a thriving 
country, they ought to rely on their own energies for rebuilding their country. The 
international community must help the transition in taking this responsibility. On the 
other hand, all countries bordering Afghanistan should at least be taken into confidence, 
especially for security-related issues, to achieve stability in the country. 
e. Special Emphasis on Making the ANSF Viable 
The ANSF must be fully capable, competent, and sustainable as soon as possible, 
as only a functioning, effective ANSF can ensure survival of Afghanistan as a state after 
U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, the ethnic makeup of the ANA must be proportionate to the 
ethnic makeup of the country; otherwise, unit warlords might have too much say in the 
ANA’s operations. For professional legitimacy, the ANA must pursue training from 
abroad, especially from Pakistani institutions due to advantages like a common 
operational environment, more expertise, and experience of the Pakistan Army. 
f. Economic Alternatives  
The Afghan government needs to immediately introduce alternate means to 
counter the narco-economy, i.e., uplifting the agriculture/local industries and getting 
access to Western markets. Smuggling will be further controlled by settling the border 
issue with Pakistan, or at least improving border SOPs. For instance, Afghanistan’s 
handmade carpet industry—the most popular in the region—could be further encouraged, 
and could gain access to the international market through legal means. This alone would 
make a huge difference through legal export and taxation. 
g. Speedy Justice  
Delivering speedy justice is an essential element of the Taliban, and convinced 
many people to join them. Modern justice systems may not work or may be difficult to 
implement in a country like Afghanistan, where traditional values/beliefs cannot be 
disregarded. Instead, their local/village councils (Jirga system) may further be legitimized 
to play a constructive role in society at the national level. Open hearings in this sort of 
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system, with governmental oversight, would reduce the chance of corruption and provide 
the general public with justice through their own ways and culture.  
h. Madrassah Reforms  
The majority of Afghan population seeks knowledge through religious seminaries 
(madrassahs). Religious extremism and narrow-mindedness spread in the society may be 
addressed by undertaking reforms in the madrassah system. The Afghan government 
must take necessary measures in this regard such as registering religious madrassahs of 
all sects, standardizing their syllabi, banning of the rogue groups handling such 
educational places, apprehension of wanted/blacklisted terrorist elements among religious 
scholars, and through effective border controls (not allowing foreign funding/support of 
madrassahs for anti-state interests). 
i. Adult Literacy Programs 
Afghanistan’s education sector has shown progress, and more than 8.3 millions of 
children including 40 percent of girls have gained access to schools since 2001.224 But, 
after three decades of constant war, uneducated adults form the majority of the 
population. “If militants can motivate people to join their ranks in the name of Islam, then 
why not motivate them to work for their own country? It is possible, through education 
that good results will occur.”225 
j. Developing Media Warfare 
Media in the recent past has emerged as the fourth pillar of any state, owing to its 
reach, speed, and potential to spread perceptions. The media can influence every facet of 
society, including civic values, cultural heritage, religious beliefs, and the economic, 
military, and political arenas. As a war-waging tool, it can leave its imprint not with guns 
and bullets, but with words and images, opinions and views, to show viewers/listeners the 
justness of a cause as well as the adversary’s implacability. If Afghanistan strengthens 
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this state pillar, it could use today’s gains for tomorrow’s prosperity. Free, fair, and 
objective media can make the Afghan people think, and can generate an atmosphere of 
openness while also generating a positive counter-narrative against extremists or the 
Taliban. Nationalism, human rights awareness, and women’s empowerment can be 
promoted. The Afghans themselves, however, must adopt and pursue this avenue; 
otherwise, the media may prove counter-productive for Afghan society due to outsiders’ 
influence.  
k. Setting Developmental Goals 
The Afghan government must set priorities and developmental goals regarding 
their internal dynamics in order to improve law and order, followed by political and 
economic stability. Such goals could be summarized as:  
1. Goal 1 (by year 5 of the transformation decade): Achieve consensus and 
political harmony through reconciliation and proportionate participation of 
all provinces, ethnicities, tribes, minorities, and women. 
2. Goal 2 (by year 7 of the transformation decade): Enforce the writ of the 
government across the country through an effective ANSF, and by ruling 
out insurgency/terrorism/others’ proxies in the country by hard and soft 
power means.  
3. Goal 3 (by year 7 of the transformation decade): Bring economic reforms 
through immediate and long-term alternatives.  
4. Goal 4 (by year 8 of the transformation decade): Resolve issues with 
neighbors, especially Pakistan (i.e., the Durand Line), or at least work to 
improve border SOPs.  
5. Goal 5 (by year 9 of the transformation decade): Internal transformation 
through institutional reforms, e.g., speedy justice, education and 
madrassahs reforms, etc. 
6. Goal 6 (by year 10 of the transformation decade): Create good foreign 





Pakistan today stands at a critical juncture as regards Afghanistan. Any situation 
that arises during/after U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will directly affect Pakistan. 
Afghanistan, merely due to its strategic geographical position, has huge economic 
potential. Located in the heart of the energy corridor, transit trade alone may be able to 
sustain its national economy. However, the opportunity can only be exploited if the 
political landscape after U.S. drawdown enables such an environment. A peaceful and 
stable Afghanistan would also provide a gateway to the CARs through the shortest transit 
route. 
The intended setup and role of the ANA remains questionable in the post-U.S. 
exit environment. Despite considerable investment in training, its capacity remains 
doubtful. The Taliban’s anticipated reaction to the political structure the United States 
intends to leave behind (coupled with the ANA’s deficiencies) will directly impact the 
country’s peace. The most pronounced impact of the drawdown will be on Pakistan due 
to its geographical proximity and demography. Afghanistan provides a host of 
opportunities for the entire region in general, and Pakistan in particular, depending upon 
the prospects of stability.  
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